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American Foreign Policy: The Great Debate, 1951.

N. D. Harper.

The recall of General Douglas MacArthur, dramatically announced at a news conference at the White House in the early morning of April 11, touched off a new phase of the Great Debate on American foreign policy. The circumstances of his arrival and the hysterical welcome accorded to him deserve brief analysis because they form the emotional background for one of the most thorough discussions of American policy.

There was nothing to parallel the stunned public reaction since the shots at Fort Sumter marked the outbreak of the Civil War. His dismissal produced thousands of editorials by outraged editors; in street car and barber shop, on the side walk and supermarket, at bars and in the commonroom, this was John Doe's one topic of indignant conversation. After the first shock of surprise, telegrams began to cascade into Blair House and the Capitol: Western Union and the Post Office delivered over 27,000 letters and telegrams in the first twelve days to the President. "Impeach the Judas in the White House who sold us down the river to left wingers and the U.N." "Impeach the Imbecile, the B. who calls himself President." "This is another sell out of our country to those dirty Britons who run the Far East while our sons give up their lives for British domination and dirty dollars. It's just more dirty politics." Truman was booed at a ball park and was burned in effigy in Texas and Tennessee. San Francisco breathlessly waited for the *Bataan* to touch down; the *Chicago Tribune* greeted the shadow of his plane as it flew across the Middle West. A hushed Congress hung on every word of his address on April 19, and tears coursed down the cheeks of hard boiled editors as they feverishly recorded his words. "We heard God speak here today," commented an Oxford and Harvard trained Representative.

The frenzied hysteria reached its peak on April 20 when the New York Police Department handled 7,500,000 sightseers and the Department of Sanitation removed 16,500,000 pounds of litter

after the show. I stood with the crowds on Chicago's Midway, outside the University. Here were displayed some of the few dissenting placards, and the cheers were mingled with isolated boos, coming appropriately enough from the marines and naval men, the forgotten men of the Pacific War. The official cavalcade slowly traversed the five miles to the Loop where bedlam was let loose by the 4,000,000 spectators. That night Soldier Field was jammed to capacity to listen to the military orator: guns roared a welcome to the five star general and a cascade of fireworks filled the skies. Never had a people let itself go on such an emotional jag as Americans did in these Alice in Wonderland weeks. It was in part an anti-Democratic demonstration; it also arose because many Americans believed that they were already at war. Almost every town and city was represented in the casualty lists from Korea.

The "Greater Debate."

It was in this atmosphere that the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees inaugurated the "Greater Debate" on American foreign policy. The inquiry into the circumstances of the General's dismissal quickly developed into a searching examination of the basic problems of global strategy, an "inquest" into the nature of American Far Eastern policy. It quickly became clear that the 48-star Commander-in-chief, even although only an ex-National Guard captain, undoubtedly had the power to fire a 5-star general, and that as Omar Bradley put it, the MacArthur strategy would "involve us in the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy."

What was the real issue behind the political manoeuvres of the belligerent Republicans and the harried Democrats with their eyes fixed on the 1952 presidential election? Americans were shocked at the rapid deterioration in American security in the post-war period. The war had ended with America as unquestionably the predominant world power, apparently secure in sole possession of the atomic bomb. As the war-time coalition disintegrated and the cold war developed, American diplomacy appeared to falter. The collapse of Chiang Kai-shek gave a douche of cold water to waning American optimism. In Korea, the defeat of "our first team by their third team" coincided with bitter wrangles in the United Nations. World War III seemed to be, not just around the corner, but on the front door step with few allies to lend a hand. It was this feeling that touched off a series of frantic questions. What is our foreign policy? *Time* suggested that there were no architects of foreign policy, only building inspectors. MacArthur told the

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Massachusetts legislature on July 25, "our foreign policy has become a mass of confused misunderstandings and vacillations . . . It has almost blown with every wind, changed with every tide. The sorry truth is we have no policy." The other major question was, why has our position changed so slowly? Mr. Republican Taft had a pat answer for the Daughters of the American Revolution: "Our Far Eastern policy was dominated by a friendly attitude to Communism long after the Communist aims should have been clear to anyone." He repeated the charge in his *A Foreign Policy for Americans* in November last. "The Far Eastern Division of the State Department was inspired, to say the least, by strong prejudice in favour of Chinese Communists, and that seems to have been shared by Secretary of State Acheson himself."

The Great Debate, inaugurated by the speeches of ex-Ambassador Kennedy in November 1950 and completed with the passage of the McLennan resolution the following April, and the Greater Debate, commencing with the dismissal of MacArthur, may be said in a sense to have acted as a catalyst of American policy and to have secured a publicising of policies imperfectly communicated to the American people previously. The discussions showed the sharpest differences of opinion, but the differences were largely differences related to means rather than ends: the significant thing was that there was a substantial area of agreement between the warring parties in the battle for the American mind.

The area of agreement covered broadly the global situation in general and, to a lesser degree, the Pacific scene in particular. What were the premises upon which policy would have to be based? There was unanimity on one point: the real threat to American security came from Russia. While the area of Soviet control had expanded little beyond the lines of 1945, there had been an unprecedented increase in the area of indirect influence. This had on the one hand given it control of key strategic areas in Europe, such as the Polish plain and the Danube basin, and on the other hand it has increased its influence and pressure in the sensitive areas in Asia from Suez to Peiping. "As an American looks at the world, he tends to see the Soviet Union as an organized centre of power based securely in the great land mass of Europe and Asia. Since 1945 he has watched this great power press unremittingly in all possible directions across the borders . . . These actions can be, and have been, interpreted as the comprehensive attempt of a land power to take advantage of its superior strength to build a dominating strategic position in the world. Because the United States is the leader of the nations that actively oppose these Soviet expan-

sionist policies, a position gained by the Soviet Union is considered to be a position lost to the United States." (*Major Problems of U.S. Foreign Policy*, 1951-2, pp. 148-9. Brookings Institute).

The picture was further darkened by the knowledge that Russia had appreciably narrowed the gap in atomic bombs and that the American Air Force was expanding at a slower rate than anticipated. Some, like Taft, might believe that the enemy was Russian communism; others, like Acheson, might see Russian imperialism as the threat to American security. All were agreed that the problem was to resist the expanding strength of Russia and redress the balance of world power, seriously modified since the end of the Pacific war. Americans were in a sense hypnotized by the increasing polarisation of world power.

Asia and the Pacific.

Americans were becoming increasingly sensitive to the changes in Asia and the Pacific. Here a power vacuum had developed and here was to be found the most acute economic disequilibrium. America's initial adventures into Far Eastern diplomacy followed the Spanish War of 1898 at a period when no security interests were involved. Secretary of State Hay had laid down the outmoded doctrine of the Open Door to deal with the fluid situation developing from the Western partition of China. The other formula—"the administrative and territorial integrity of China"—was quickly added in an outburst of emotional idealism. The two formulae were really unrelated to the realities of the Chinese situation. Yet for almost half a century they formed the theory behind American Far Eastern diplomacy, and persistent attempts were made to follow the pattern laid down by Hay. Political stability in the interwar period had been largely ensured by the firm control of the colonial powers and the equilibrium attempted by the Washington agreements of 1921-2. But the whole power structure had steadily disintegrated in the pre-war and post-war periods. The dissolution of the old colonial empires accompanied, and was in part caused by, the modification of the European balance of power. The steady contraction of British and French, Dutch and American influence in the relatively undeveloped areas was matched by the steady shift of Russian influence in North Asia and the collapse of Japan. Unconditional surrender in 1945 had created a power vacuum here, and the State Department continued the pre-war policy of trying to influence the course of events in China to achieve the purposes behind the Hay policies.

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Since China was the key to the peace and stability of the Far East, it became a cardinal point in American thinking that China must become the Asian bulwark of the post-war peace structure in the Pacific. This explains the continued support for Chiang Kai-shek, the only leader who seemed capable of achieving the traditional objective of a strong China with its administrative and territorial integrity unimpaired. By a curious paradox, four years after the war, China was unified, perhaps as never before for centuries, but under a Communist régime. The very achievement of traditional objectives appeared to threaten the vital security interests of the United States. The Korean reverses appeared as the final catastrophe. The shift begun by MacArthur, the policy of converting Japan into the "workshop of East Asia" as well as a bastion against communism, became of even greater importance. At the same time many groups were reluctant to abandon Chiang Kai-shek in the changed power situation.

Changes in East Asia.

Many Americans, and not least the State Department, were conscious of the revolutionary social movements in East Asia. They realized that pressure of population and the technical backwardness of Asian governments made difficult the development of stable or viable economies in the new nationalist states. Americans were aware of the need for capital investment and technical assistance to stabilize the new governments but were often bewildered by the problems of revolution. This uncertainty was intensified by the rapid ebbing of the goodwill evident in most Asian communities after V.J. Day. What so many Americans were unable to understand was the real nature of the triple Asian revolution of the post-war period. The upsurge of nationalism, the anti-Western movements and the development of social democracy coincided with, and were effectively used in, communist propaganda. The new national states which emerged were often inefficient, inevitably sensitive to Western interference, and usually incapable of effective exercise of power in the new Pacific setup. Forgetting their own revolutionary past, Americans failed to distinguish between social revolutionary movements arising out of local economic and social situations and the communist unrest that often accompanied and attempted to use these situations. The result was, as the *Christian Science Monitor* (4/9/51) pointed out, "the West has failed to ally itself with the very forces it has unleashed. In Asian eyes, America is associated with a Chinese régime which long ago lost its revolutionary élan, and became increasingly identified as a party

of social reaction, of special privilege and of vested interest." This was, and still is, the Achilles heel of American Far Eastern policy; it is in large measure the result of the time lag between American thinking and the swift movement of events. It is also a result of the confused discussion of problems of communism and its world influence.

Basis of Policy.

Dean Acheson, giving evidence before the MacArthur committee, declared that "it is not just a difference of method which is now under examination. What is challenged is the bed rock purpose of our foreign policy." What is the "bed rock" of American foreign policy? For half a century this was defined in geographical terms, in terms of a geographical location which separated the nation from the power conflicts of Europe. A series of geographical, regional, policies emerged with but little integration: the Monroe Doctrine, the Open Door policy, the Good Neighbour policy. But as the long term implications of the two world wars became apparent, it became clear that the isolationism or semi-isolationism of the pre-Pearl Harbour period was no longer applicable in a world increasingly polarised, that regional policies must be co-ordinated into a global policy. It is a truism that the basic policy of a country must be its own security. But it was clear that the security of the United States was now dependent upon new circumstances. Its strategic frontier was no longer confined to the continental waters of North America. They must now be extended from the Golden Gate and Cape Cod to Central Europe, the Middle East and the Far East. It was also clear that the security and economic stability of the United States were inseparable from the security and well being of the world as a whole, that security was indivisible. These new circumstances had helped to precipitate the Great Debate and produce the kind of conclusions that emerged from that debate.

U.S. and the Soviet Union

In assessing the weight of the new circumstances and in evaluating the shifting balance of power, turning dangerously against the United States, the State Department and the vast majority of Americans saw clearly that the real threat came from the Soviet Union. The analysis upon which the State Department has formulated its policy is the analysis of one of its top planners, George F. Kennan. He had served for years in Russia and was the top Russian specialist of the Department; at the beginning of this year

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he took up duty as the American Ambassador to Moscow. In an anonymously published article in *Foreign Affairs* (July, 1947), he stated that Soviet expansionism is "a fluid stream which moves constantly, wherever it is permitted to move, toward a given goal. Its main concern is to make sure that it has filled every nook and cranny available to it in the basin of world power. But if it finds unassailable barriers in its path, it accepts these philosophically and accommodates itself to them. The main thing is that there should always be pressure, unceasing constant pressure, toward the desired goal. There is no trace of any feeling in Soviet psychology that the goal must be reached at any given time." The process of expansion is of course immensely facilitated by the existence of vacuums: Central Europe, South East Asia, the Middle East and the Far East. To combat this process, it is essential to place "unassailable barriers" in Russia's path, to fill the vacuums which are an invitation to a further extension of power. The long term purpose is peace and security, the "patient but firm and vigilant containment" of Soviet imperialism without resort to war, "the use of counter force adroitly and vigilantly at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and manoeuvres of Soviet power." The steady filling of economic and military and political vacuums, the patient but firm checking of every act of aggression; this would slowly redress the balance of power. By the use of limited force for a series of limited objectives it would be possible to avoid or postpone a third global conflict.

The Policy of Containment.

The policy of containment meant in practice certain corollaries; economic aid to fill the vacuums created by the Second World War (the Marshall Plan and E.C.A. aid to Asia); military assistance to threatened areas (the Truman Plan, the North Atlantic Pact, the Rio Pact, the Pacific Pact and the treaties with the Philippines and Japan). Military assistance was designed to defend Europe, not to liberate it after it might have been overrun by Russia. Both economic and military assistance should obviously be carried through with the closest collaboration with other powers. There should be no unilateral internationalism, only collective action to promote collective security. This involved support for the United Nations, and specific regional pacts within the framework of the United Nations.

These are vital parts of the policy in application; isolationism would have to cease in Brussels and Paris, in Rome and Canberra, in

London and Chicago and Washington. A comprehensive policy of containment through international collaboration must be conceived in terms of America's actual and potential strength: "planetary involvement", any attempt to underwrite the whole U.N., would be beyond American capacity, would strain the American economy and reach the point when democratic support in America for such a policy would disappear. But it is essential to gear the American economy to the process of the speedy building up of positions of strength in the free world. The Kremlin, weighing the prospects of success, would negotiate and arrive at a peaceful settlement of differences. The policy called for no ideological crusade against communism but rather for the realistic redressing of the balance of power so that it would turn against Soviet Russia and make aggression clearly less profitable than negotiation.

Containment also meant, because of the dangers of diffusion of strength, some definition of strategic areas, the drawing of global frontiers which could be adequately held. This became a favourite sport of ex-presidents and presidential candidates as well as a more serious occupation for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the State Department. These frontiers have been conceived of in somewhat elastic terms, changing as the power balance changes or as aggression has threatened. The pre-war salient in the Pacific ran through Hawaii, Midway and Guam to the Philippines. To-day, "our strategic frontier [has shifted] to embrace the entire Pacific Ocean which has become a vast moat to protect us as long as we held it", MacArthur told Congress. The outworks of U.S. defences are here formed by a vast arc from the Aleutians to the fringes of the Asian mainland and the Philippines: Japan, Okinawa and Formosa are conceived of as vital redoubts in the chain, with Japan as the keystone. The policy of containment, then, involved a global strategy, political and military; in practice it was based on the premises of interlocked alliances, collective security, and if wars, then limited wars for limited objectives. It necessitated a whole series of day to day decisions at the highest levels, decisions of a political and economic and military kind.

The Great Debate illuminated many problems and a great segment of American policy. It revealed differences of method, chiefly within Republican ranks. The isolationist wing included Kennedy and Hoover, with what was described as the policy of Gibraltarism: withdrawal to North America which was to be converted into the arsenal of democracy and the new heart of Western civilisation. It also included Robert Taft with his "island perimeter policy": a policy of limited land forces to assist other democracies and a re-

liance upon air and naval power based on Britain, Australia and New Zealand. The internationalist group, believing with Benjamin Franklin that "we must all hang together or all hang separately", included the vast majority of Democrats and a significant Republican minority. Thomas Dewey pressed for a vigorous defence policy which would be based upon 100 land divisions, 80 air groups and the taking of the navy out of moth balls. The internationalists also included Warren of California, Wayne Morse of Oregon, Lodge and Saltonstall and Stassen. The debate resulted in an almost complete victory for the Administration and the internationalists: support for a policy of rearming and defending rather than liberating Europe. It was a repudiation of isolationism.

This was the "policy vacuum" that was assailed by MacArthur and the Republicans as the Greater Debate commenced. The Asia Firsters and the China Lobby attempted to fight a rearguard action against the decision for priority to Europe. They were joined by the older isolationists who repudiated Europe as morally decadent. MacArthur appeared to give priority to Asia but only because here, he told Congress, "the Communist conspirators have elected to make their play for global conquest. If we lose the war to communism in Asia, the fall of Europe is inevitable." It was for this reason that he declared at Austin, Texas, "our first line of defence for Western Europe is not the Elbe, it is not the Rhine, it is the Yalu." But he gave small comfort to the isolationists who were prepared to retreat to an American Gibraltar: the Yalu line was a tactical necessity and did not involve a rejection of universal containment. "I believe that we should defend every place from communism." He later returned to an Asia First position.

Much of the discussion centred round the means of achieving containment. MacArthur proposed to convert a limited war with limited objectives into a preventive or provocative war which would only end in a stalemate. This involved the rejection of one of the basic premises of the State Department and the considered opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He also rejected a basic corollary, the need for collective action and interlocked alliances.

The Republican assault on Far Eastern policy involved also a repudiation of the instruments of American policy, an attack upon the State Department itself as an unreliable agency for the execution of basic American policies. The malicious attacks of Joseph McCarthy, with his paranoid sniping at the alleged pro-communist sympathies of top planners, had helped focus attention on some of the failures of American policy in application. The MacArthur hearings were in part a logical consequence of his previous smear

campaigns. A careful reading of the evidence shows only too clearly that to most of the Republican members of the senatorial committees the real American strategic frontier was neither the Elbe nor the Yalu; it was the Potomac. The major targets were not Manchurian air fields but rather Blair House and the State Department, Truman and Acheson. Much of the controversy was directed, not towards the clarification of policy but rather towards the presidential campaigns of 1952. The G.O.P. clearly hoped to make foreign policy one of the live issues for the first time in thirty years.

Summing Up.

What was the outcome of the Greater Debate? In any political as well as any military conflict, total victory is impossible. On the whole the Administration gained ground and increased its stature. Its policy was communicated clearly to millions of Americans for the first time. It was able effectively to explode the Yalta myth and to demonstrate that it had never pushed Chiang Kai-shek over the cliffs: the evidence of Acheson and Averell Harriman on these points is crystal clear. At the same time, the State Department was forced into a partial retreat in face of bitter and persistent opposition. There were compromises in detail, some narrowing of the gulf between partisan policies. Formosa was now clearly within the American strategic perimeter and there was no question in the near future of its return to Peiping. America would firmly resist proposals for seating Communist China in the U.N., even to the extent of using the veto. Aid to Chiang would be speeded up: he has continued to exercise a fatal attraction for all political groups. American pressure resulted in the cessation of rubber shipments to China and a more stringent policing of British trade through Hong Kong. Congress was prepared to expand aid to Asia, perhaps at the expense of N.A.T.O. aid to Europe: this is not yet clear despite the slashing of Mutual Security Aid from \$8.5 billions to \$7.5 billions. There was also a greater willingness to grant aid to French Indo-China, and a clearer appreciation of British policy in Malaya.

In retrospect, the Greater Debate does not seem to have impaired the overall global policy of patient containment of Russia. There seems to have been no reversal of China policy, although perhaps a modification of the means of its application. The strategy of containment now meant strongest support for N.A.T.O. and its extension to cover the Middle East; the maintenance in anti-communist hands of the Pacific islands as well as those parts of the Asian land mass that were still anti-communist. The strategic

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frontier lay in the island chain girding Asia from Alaska to Indonesia and Australia. One of the most serious things was this: at a time when the State Department was expanding with unprecedented rapidity and was shedding its leisurely nineteenth century atmosphere, it was being harried by a pernicious witch hunt which hamstrung it at every point. Here the responsibility lies with McCarthy whose unashamed and mendacious attacks were often supported by top ranking Republicans from Taft downwards.

There are many cogent criticisms that can be made of the zig-zags in the day to day policy of the State Department and the Truman administration, criticisms, too, perhaps, of the general direction of their policy. But there is one significant thing: America has become internationalist as never before. World leadership exercised by Great Britain in the nineteenth century has now passed to the United States. Mathew Arnold's description of Britain can now be applied to the United States. "A weary titan . . . staggering on to her goal, bearing on shoulders, immense and Atlantean, the load, well nigh not to be borne, of the vast orb of her fate." To many of her friends the weary titan resembles more the sophomore football player, the ball carrier not quite certain of the plays and the signals, fumbling the unaccustomed ball to the concern of his team mates and the spectators. In many ways Americans appear emotionally unstable and immature. There is the curious mixture of Sir Galahad and the shrewd horse trader. Too often sentiment overlies realism: there is the tendency to think in terms of lofty moral principles and legal forms. There is a reluctance or an inability to see the world in other than absolute terms: grey is a tone missing from the American colour pattern. Americans are prone, as Kennan has pointed out, "to judge others by the extent to which they contrive to be like ourselves," to suffer from "the colossal conceit of thinking that you could suddenly make international life over into what you believe to be your own image." There is the understandable but dangerous belief that the "pay-off" for economic and military aid is unqualified support for all American policies. Overconfidence and brashness are followed by morbid soul-searching and a hasty undervaluing of real American strength and power. There is perhaps an inadequate appreciation of the value and vitality of democracy.

All these weaknesses emerged during the two debates. Yet despite them, the hard fact remains that America has been undergoing a revolution in her foreign policy. The bitterness of the MacArthur controversy, the short-sightedness of the food-for-India debate, the incredible follies of the McCarthy hysteria must not be allowed

to conceal one basic fact: that America has accepted, for good or ill, the responsibilities of world leadership. For the first time in her history she has given firm commitments of a global kind, commitments in advance. In this process, she has attained a surprising degree of unity and maturity. The real danger, perhaps, lies in the revival of isolationism. Nothing would give greater heart to the surviving American isolationists than the retreat of Western Europe or Asia to a new isolationism or neutralism. With taxation reaching new peaks to finance policies of international aid, with millions of ordinary Americans accepting, often a little reluctantly, the new burdens of leadership, isolationism could return. Responsibility will lie here as much with London and Paris, with Canberra and Rome, as with Chicago and the Middle West.

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An Incomplete Foreign Affairs Committee.

T. N. M. Buesst.

When moving in the House of Representatives last October that a foreign affairs committee be appointed, the Minister for External Affairs, Mr. Casey, explained that the establishment of such a body had been very much in the mind of the Government for some time. Mr. Menzies had in fact announced his intention of setting up an all-party parliamentary standing committee on foreign affairs as early as November 1949. The announcement evoked nothing but favourable comment, for such committees function successfully in other democratic countries—Canada, for example—and it seemed appropriate that Australia, with an enhanced status and a growing sense of responsibility in world affairs, should follow their example.

Early in 1950 Mr. Spender, the then Minister, revealed to Parliament the details of a plan of his own for setting up the committee, and a few months later he appears to have approached certain representatives of the Opposition with the intention, it may be assumed, of enlisting their support, or at least ascertaining their views. He evidently dropped the project, for no further overt moves were made until Mr. Casey introduced his motion of 17th October.

The motion provided for a committee consisting of nineteen members, twelve from the House of Representatives and seven from the Senate, to consider such matters as were referred to it by the Minister for External Affairs, who should make available to the committee information within such categories and on such conditions as he might consider desirable. Provision was made for ensuring the secrecy of the committee's deliberations and for ensuring that its reports should be forwarded to the Minister; Parliament would be informed of but would not see the reports. The motion also provided that the committee should have no power to send, for persons, papers or records without the Minister's concurrence, and that all evidence submitted to the committee should be regarded as confidential. Mr. Casey expressed the belief that members of all political parties desired greater opportunities to discuss mat-

ters affecting international affairs, "which are becoming," he added, "as we know to our distress, more important every day."

Dr. Evatt and his party have never raised any objection in principle to a foreign affairs committee. On the contrary, they have always claimed, and no doubt still claim, to be entirely favourably disposed to a development in parliamentary practice that has met with success elsewhere. It is not without interest, incidentally, that Dr. Evatt himself made no move, during his years in office, to set up any such body.

In the debate at Canberra he and other Labour spokesmen at once made plain that the Opposition would strongly resist the idea of a body constituted in the manner proposed by the Government. Such a committee would be entirely ineffective, they maintained. Without a substantial degree of independence and authority to act on its own initiative, it would be merely an instrument of the Department of External Affairs; while its members, bound by the provisions as to secrecy, would not be able to make any practical use of such special information as they might acquire. One caustic critic declared that "a committee on foreign affairs in this time of danger must have teeth . . . it must not be just an all-talkie festival at which honorable members imagine they are working for the good of the country whenever some official hands them a circular on which he has hurriedly stamped the words 'Top Secret'".

By way of remedy the Opposition suggested a number of amendments to the motion. They were far-reaching proposals which would have had the effect, if accepted, of investing the committee with a very considerable degree of autonomy; of in fact giving it complete freedom from ministerial control.

The amendments would have given the committee the right to conduct investigations on its own initiative, or on the initiative of either House of Parliament. It would have been given the power at its discretion to conduct its proceedings in public and, in the course of its investigations, to call for "persons, papers and records". Another amendment would have enabled either House to decide that the committee's reports be published, thus taking away from the Department, in Dr. Evatt's words, "the absolute veto authority to stop publication of a report which may be of great significance and importance in the public interest". It could easily be seen that Government and Opposition spokesmen, in their views on what should be the functions and powers of the new committee, differed at every point.

If the Opposition rejected the motion as it stood, the Govern-

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ment as decisively rejected the proposed amendments. In the view of the Government, Mr. Casey explained, the committee's function should be to act as a source of information to Parliament and to the public, and as an instrumentality through the working of which members of all parties might become better informed on international affairs. There could be no question of setting up a body to act as the creator of policy, for that is the privilege and responsibility of the government of the day, much less of allowing it to be used as a "propaganda forum" for critics of the government's foreign policy.

When Dr. Evatt insisted that the committee should itself be responsible for determining whether or not to sit in camera, he stated that in the United States such proceedings are not held in camera. The statement, whatever its accuracy, did not at all impress Mr. Casey and his supporters. Indeed, with the dramatic appearance of General MacArthur before the American Senate no doubt fresh in mind, they were probably more anxious to avoid than to follow American practice in this regard, even if such practice were constitutionally appropriate in Australia, with a parliamentary system differing so radically from that of the United States.

Another amendment, giving the committee power to send for persons, papers or records, was equally objectionable from the Government's standpoint. The last thing desired, indeed, as Mr. Eric Harrison remarked, was that the committee should be given the opportunity "to bring ministers, commanding generals and chiefs of staff before it in order to expose top level secrets which could be disseminated to our friends of the Soviet Union".

An earnest effort was made by Mr. Casey, however, to induce his critics at any rate to give his plan a trial. The plan had as its primary purpose, he said, the conveying to rank-and-file members of information which otherwise they might only be able to obtain with difficulty, or not at all; as the sponsor of the plan he naturally wanted it to succeed and to bring to the notice of the committee as many of the problems of the day as possible. But it had to be remembered, he continued, that most of the material coming from overseas to the Department of External Affairs was secret information, if only for a time. To reveal secrets that are not "Australian secrets", or to reveal them prematurely, would destroy the confidence reposed in Australia by foreign governments.

To questions from a Labour member, Mr. Rosevear, asking how, if all information acquired by committee members were confiden-

tial, such members could subsequently use it in Parliament, Mr. Casey gave a not entirely convincing reply. He described as nonsense the notion that information obtained by committee members would have to be "bottled up permanently inside them". But while he first laid great stress on the many secrets at stake, he later affirmed that little not-to-be-disclosed information would actually be acquired by members. There would seem to be some inconsistency here, unless the inference be accepted that the Minister for External Affairs would always be inclined to play for safety by revealing to the committee as little secret information as possible.

The House accepted the Government's motion by a vote on party lines and in due course, in February last, it was announced that eleven members had been appointed to the committee. Seven members from the Lower House have been appointed, and four from the Senate, under the chairmanship of Mr. Rupert Ryan, Liberal member for Flinders, all selected from the ranks of the Government parties.

Eight places still remain to be filled and the committee is thus incomplete, in party representation as well as in numbers. It will presumably remain incomplete until such time as agreement can be reached upon the appointment of eight representatives of the Labour Party. Mr. Calwell, as deputy leader of that party, has declared that the Opposition would accept the appointments, but would refuse to co-operate until the committee's terms of reference had been considerably extended.

To the student of international affairs this conflict of opinion as to the proper functions of the committee will be a matter of extreme regret. Few members in the Parliament at Canberra display much interest in or knowledge of world events; any move designed to raise the level of parliamentary debates on foreign affairs must surely be a move in the right direction, for such debates should assist both in the formulation of Australia's foreign policy and in the creation of an alert and informed public opinion. Moreover, unless means can be found to reconcile these conflicting party views upon the relatively trivial problem of what are to be the functions of a parliamentary committee, there can be little hope of achieving that unity and continuity of our country's foreign policy which both political parties profess to regard as so essential.

This party conflict of view is all the more regrettable because of what appears to be a growing tendency to approach issues of foreign policy in a partisan spirit. The debates on the ratification of the Japanese Peace Treaty afford a recent and striking illus-

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tration of this tendency. Even if the activities of the committee do not actually encourage a partisan instead of a "bi-partisan" approach to such issues, there is unfortunately scant reason to expect that it will lessen the impact of party-political strife.

The committee in its present form may possibly be found to be an imperfect instrument, but obviously it must first be tested before it can be said to have failed. The Minister for External Affairs addressed an earnest plea to his political opponents, asking them to have confidence in the sincerity of the Government and assuring them that if after a trial period of six months any faults were disclosed in the new machinery, he would be the first to seek a remedy. It seems on the face of it a reasonable offer, and one by the acceptance of which, as Mr. Casey pointed out, the Opposition has nothing to lose.

On the Next Phase of British Colonial Policy.

W. E. H. Stanner.

I can make no attempt to prophesy the "future", that is the content and emphasis, of British colonial policy in its next phase. To try to do so would mean equating three sets of variables: events no one can foresee, the ways in which the events will be seen at the time, and the extent to which policy of the day will relate to and express a valid grasp of them. I shall try, rather, to deal with some conditions which will affect the next phase of policy.

I suggest that, especially, we might well look more closely than we are accustomed at (a) the "framework of reference", the box, even the prison, of thought, within which we study colonial matters; (b) at the "master"-processes or "key"-processes working within colonies; and at (c) the activity we call "policy-making". These are three of the main conditions affecting the mental approach as well as the content of policy in its next phase.

The Problems of Fundamental Diversity.

When one speaks about "British colonial policy", one has to remember that there are still about fifty territories, with a total population which must now exceed 65 millions. The "colonies" are not an entity. They are a discontinuous collection. This means that they cannot be treated as a homogeneous group for any single purpose or problem. The portmanteau approach leads to much misunderstanding. The fact of diversity is fundamental. The differences of history, geography, climate, resources, race, society, culture, constitutional status and political aspiration, probably mean many different lines of local evolution, irrespective of the intentions and hopes of policy. The probability is one to remember these days when we run so easily, and sometimes so glibly, to universalistic formulae of development.

We must expect to find that local policy varies just about as widely as the local facts of life. While we may certainly discuss what may be called "policy-in-general", we have to use very

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abstract, if high-sounding, generalities in dealing with such broad conceptions. Statements that "British policy will be to stimulate exports of raw materials by increasing the colonies' manufactured imports", or "to develop political authority down to the village", and so on, are correct enough, as far as they go, which is not far, but they have to be filled out with many whats, hows, whens and whys for specific wheres if they are to convey substantial meaning. This is not always as easy as it sounds.

What precisely, is "social welfare"? Is "development" a controlled process or a polite kind of revolution? How, exactly, do you capitalize peasant agriculture? These days, you can no longer get away with the wordy cant so much in vogue in 1945-6. If you wish to talk policy, you must specify social fields, problems, cases and methods in hard terms. The approach brings you up against questions of fact, limits of knowledge, and individualized procedures differing in scores of thousands of localities. One cannot discuss them both accurately and briefly. I would not attempt to give even an impressionistic sketch for the dozen colonies with which I am, in some degree, personally familiar.

One thing we may say with certainty. There is no prospect of comprehensive "solutions" of the wide range of problems carrying through to the next phase. The evidence that colonies and their problems are too diverse for overall formulae, either of stabilization or of directed, i.e. controlled, development, lies all round us. If policy-makers desire simplifications, let them turn elsewhere than to scientists.

If my observations are thus made in a minor key, it is of deliberation. Too many of the debates on policy at Whitehall, Canberra, Wellington, and, above all, at the Trusteeship Council have been desperately uninformed. To make policy both human and realistic in present circumstances is a heavy task of inquiry and understanding.

The Present Stage.

Let me ask, first, where we now stand in the story of Empire? Should we think of 1952 as a very late phase of the Second Empire, the First having ended in 1783? Or as a phase of a Third Empire, differing from the Second, perhaps, as Joseph Chamberlain put it in 1897, in that "the sense of possession has given place to . . . the sense of obligation"? But where, and on what specific basis, would we draw the dividing line?

To find the tap-roots, moral and intellectual, of the "policy of

obligation", if that is to be our criterion of a Third Empire, we should need to go back a long way, much farther than Chamberlain. It may give the intractable anti-Imperialist something to think about if I suggest that, in modern times, the policy of obligation owes not a little to Kipling. If not *genitor*, was he not in some sense social *pater*? His admonition in *Recessional* to the British of the Diamond Jubilee against self-complacent dominion over palm and pine was neither new nor went unheeded.

The constitutional agreements of the last half century, transforming the status of some former dependencies, cannot serve as a dividing line. They *objectified* a principle of Empire since 1783. The progressive realization of a principle does not demarcate.

The imperial, military, economic and political themes taken alone or, I think, in combination, do not provide any really satisfactory line of division. Empire was always more than any one, or all. One might otherwise speak, perhaps, of the Mercantile Empire, followed by the Empire of the New Lands, succeeded in turn by the Empire of Development and Welfare, for, no doubt, some such broad phases may be marked off. Mercantilism, *laissez faire* and State interventionism do form a kind of series. But see how oddly they would correlate with the "phases" of "imperialism", which has moved from self-interest to reluctant possession and harassed trusteeship; and scarcely less oddly with the progressive devolution of political authority.

Some people might wish to cite great events to mark off the Empire of today as the Empire, say, of the Diamond Jubilee was itself distinguished from that of the early 19th century, e.g. the abolition of slavery in 1833, Durham's report in 1839 on responsible self-government for Canada, the repeal of the Navigation Acts in 1849, the recall of the regular garrisons before the 1870's, and so on. There are many analogies, to be sure. We should certainly have to put the Ottawa Agreement of 1932 and the Development Acts of 1940-45 on a "short list". The Acts of 1940-45, especially, introduced some concepts and types of action, e.g. the "priming" of development by State intervention, and the safeguard of welfare in development, which were unfamiliar.

But, having acknowledged innovation, let us see that it is *in part* also a paraphrase of the familiar. The outlook of 1940 was not as far from Joseph Chamberlain's policy for the dependent Empire as many may at first suppose; nor, perhaps, was his from Grey's and Elgin's. The latterday "new" often appears remarkably "old". The new "liberal" policies in self-government, education, welfare,

marketing aids, development, etc., all have precedents and precursors. Even the trusteeship provisions of the 1945 Charter, much vaunted in our day as an ethical revolution, are not much more than the Dual Mandate in more ornate form.

The Over-Arching Conception.

A fairly continuous conception has arched over British colonial policy from as far back as, perhaps, it makes sense to go. If I sum it up as a conception of orderly progress within the rule of law; of moderate executive action without the use of merely arbitrary authority; of respect for individual rights and liberties; of tolerance of varied opinion; and of relative freedom within democratic limits, I may come somewhere near the heart of it. The sceptic, perhaps smiling derisively, cites a thousand defects of performance? I say only that a broad conception is not to be measured alone by detail and that, inherently, the conception is permissive. Much in the life of contemporary British colonies offers a vindication of contradictions and defects of detail. It may be that other vindications will come from events in a world progressively given over to the antithesis of British colonial principles—disorder, immoderate executive action, arbitrary authority, intolerance, the extinction of freedom and democracy, and the rise of authoritarian rather than permissive social systems.

Nations, as well as individuals, have to act out their ideas in deeds. The conception I have sketched has been stretched by an imperfect world. How much continuously antagonistic to it can it hope to over-arch? From the beginning, the challenges have been continuous. Colonial administrations had inevitably to draw, by crude empiricism (for there were no proven rules) or by deduction from changing social and political theories, on British ideas, culture and institutions, themselves in course of change. These, in their colonial translations, inevitably weakened since institutional outlooks, standards and habits were transferred without their "extra"-institutional "framework." Thus, the "state", the "law", the "market", the "church" were never the same at home as abroad. If authority said one thing, in the endless debate of what *should* be, there was always an Exeter Hall to say another, and perhaps eternal Benthamites to say something else. There has always been a time-lag between problems and ideas about problems, an "empty focus" of the day. Does the development theorist of the 1950's realize he is applying the contemporary notions of State and wealth as uncritically as the mercantilist, or as the economist of *laissez faire*?

Many varieties of men and groups acted out the broad translations in divergent ways. In every British colony we have seen planters, settlers, merchants, missionaries and officials all reading (and justifying) their duties and privileges differently, sometimes finding formulae of reconciliation, sometimes not. External circumstances have continuously changed, constantly imposing new demands and new disabilities. Conditions internal to the colonies have also taken their own lines of development, many very confused and baffling. And for every Lugard there has been a Delamere, though I ask leave to say that, fortunately, there have been fewer Stracheys than Dalhousies.

One may well ask, however: is "the over-arching conception" anything more than a myth? I for one do not think so. In recent years, many observers, I believe, have missed the wood for the trees.

Much depends on how you assess the "natural problems" of colonialism. The deductive use of a theory of perfect colonialism is common, if unconscious: it has certainly made much mischief. Those who take the trouble to analyze what is entailed in transforming a non-industrial, non-expanding type of "native" society to the point where it can face the modern world with some semblance of unity and competence, as some colonies now do, are likely to conclude that a colonial Power is brilliantly successful if it attains a balance of positive advance, amid all the changes of ideas, the confusion of events, and the relativity of standards.

I have tried to make myself aware of the startlingly different, often contradictory actions justified by interest, sentiment, theory and rule-of-thumb between the days of *laissez faire* and the days of development and welfare; of the effects of neglect and misunderstanding; of the extent to which illiteracy, poverty and disease still exist among colonial peoples; and much else of the kind—all, in some sense, under the title of the British way of colonialism. But, piecemeal, there has undoubtedly been achievement at the same time. Only preconception and dogma prevent this from being seen. One also needs a long perspective-glass. What seems "failure" may often be at the same time "success". Even colonial "nationalism", now so widely (and often mistakenly) deprecated, was entailed, from the first, in the permissive theory and practice of British colonialism. It is not necessarily because of, or a criticism of, "imperialism" that "nationalism" now supervenes so widely.

Properly regarded, British colonialism is, in many respects, an extraordinary success, given the natural conditions of experiment. If you want to test this proposition, construct an "ideal model" of an experiment in "perfect" colonialism, over the conditions of

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the last century, and faithfully work out the administrative implications. There are few scholars and critics who will make the effort. Reformers, especially, are interested only in hand-picked colonial facts. In too many instances, solicitude for colonial problems and peoples is an extension of a dislike of something at home—capital, caste, status, privilege. In this way, many stereotypes drawn from our own social and political disputes have been fastened, all too easily, on the colonies, to the general detriment.

The Frame of Thought.

We tend to think of the present and future, as well as the past, of colonies with some kind of "model" in mind. The model provides a "framework of reference" for organizing our thoughts. It may provide a convenient frame on which sentiment can harden itself into a viewpoint, or be a focus for policy, a scholarship, self-interest and prejudice alike. Some of the most powerful contemporary models—of course, there are many—are based on a deductive scheme of perfect colonialism, filled in with dubious information, the fallacies of historicism, and the motives of social and political idealism. My criticisms are directed at those which are validated only by doctrine.

A classic example can be drawn from British experience in India. I shall simplify a little: the sympathy of the outside world undoubtedly played an important part in the final attainment of Indian independence; that sympathy, at least in part, rested on a belief that an "imperialistic" Britain has "exploited" India; to this, India's poverty and backwardness were held to be mainly due; India, therefore, it was argued, should be helped to freedom from "the British yoke"; if this were done, India's main problems would be over. Thought framed on these lines exercised a powerful influence, early and late. Economists and publicists gave it a longer life by inventing the theory of "the drain" of Indian wealth to Britain. They dropped the theory when they could not reconcile presupposition with fact. However, the exploitation model of thought lingers on. I have no complaint of any kind to make of India's independence, and would be the last to exculpate Britain from faults of performance. I simply observe that each term of the argument was, at best, only parallel—in some respects quite distantly—with the truth. Consequently, the extinction of British sovereignty abated nothing of India's poverty, backwardness, and inner conflict.

Many people think, again, of existing colonies as eventually shaping into replicas of the political democracies and industrial

economies of the West, and even "demand" this future for them. That again is a "model": in this case, a futuristic model. The colonies are, by and large, poor countries, with problems intrinsically more difficult than those of Western countries, though an equivalence of expectations seems to be growing. On the whole, it seems, on present indications in terms of average real standards and enjoyed rights, more likely that we shall see further Liberias, Cubas and Haitis than colonial Switzerlands, more little Egypts, Indias and Chinas than Swedens. This, too, is a "model", based on an estimate of the quality of colonial resources, the demographic trends, the West's capacity to produce new capital, and our inability to elucidate the problems of the "planned" new culture and society. I am hopeful that an urgent sense of felt need will produce the solutions. But, as a social scientist, I cannot but be aware that a long succession of theorists have always promised "solutions" just around the corner. We live in times when there are inflations of spiritual, psychological and social demand as well as of "economic" demand. The conditions in which "demands" can validly be made, and expectations fulfilled, are all too easily subject both to over-estimate and under-estimate. The scientist has the duty to insist that social and political philosophies of pre-supposition should take social limits properly into account.

Two kinds of "model", which can be called the "optimistic-idealistic" and its close relative, the "humanitarian-expiatory", are especially widespread and powerful. I criticize both reluctantly since, even if mistaken, they have been mainly responsible for mobilizing colonial aid programmes, which otherwise might not have been attempted on such a scale. But many scientists think that on all the "tests" we can at present apply many colonial peoples have only negligible industrial prospects, since on present knowledge the economic base does not seem to be there. That we, and they, may waste much time and capital finding this out. That "development" measures can rarely, if ever, it seems, on present experience, be large enough, or speedy enough, to make much difference in *average* conditions, which alone count. That what seems most widely to happen at present in the worst cases, at least over the short term, is an increase of inequality, so that if the poor become no poorer, since that would often be difficult, the rich become richer. That what we think of as "political devolution on democratic lines" may lead, not to a growth of democracy, but to the reinforcement or establishment of selfish oligarchies.

Now, these propositions, and others of the kind which could be advanced, might turn out to be wrong. We all hope to see them

disproved. But the fact that, when stated, they arouse such intense antagonism, when there is evidently a fair factual basis for them, might make us suspect that we are more closely in the grip of an opinion-cult than we realize. Simple optimism and uncritical idealism have little value in social action. A humanitarianism which over-simplifies human problems by the use of fallacious doctrine only deepens embitterment by encouraging self-refuting social actions. And the expiatory theme in colonial management makes almost impossible an understanding of the natural problems of colonialism.

Many men of influence in the world of ideas, both here and in the colonies, had the substance of their colonial outlook formed in the pre-war period. We all remember this period well: the "have v. have not" dispute; the claims by Germany and Italy for the return of the mandates; the raw materials' debate; the demands by politicians and others for the "liquidation" of Empire; the endless propaganda against "imperialism"; the reformist—perfectionist social science; the agitation against racial privilege; the deeper consciousness that no one clearly knew, in spite of a hundred asserted "solutions", what to do about a hundred colonial problems from land tenure to industrial caste; the effects of depression and autarchy; and much else. We remember also the inert policy of the day. One does not expect to find, except by accident, a heavy practicability in colonial affairs in a time which produces, at the metropolis, a politics of crisis.

There are still days, however, in which the scientist tries in vain to speak in the indicative mood. Few reformers of colonialism are interested in the indicative. They use mainly the imperative. Policy, to rate at all, we are told, has to be at once "bold", "progressive", "modern", "massive" and I know not what else besides. It is not long since a distinguished British politician made what he called "an urgent and irresistible plea" for "a dynamic policy of colonial change". There is something seriously wrong with thinking that runs so easily to such slogans. Colonial change is already "dynamic", independently of any urgent and irresistible pleas we may make. Our problem is to analyze the dynamic forces more closely.

The external pressures on colonial powers are due for re-appraisal. Consider how, since 1945, Britain has tried, less and less successfully, to make a deference to the Trusteeship Council, and its wishes and criticisms, fit in with a knowledge gathered over many years, of what can and cannot be done, and at what speed, in given conditions in given colonial areas. Can we accept the Trusteeship Council as composed of informed and detached authorities? Con-

sider the intense effort which is being made to pull raw materials out of colonies for the recovery and defence programmes of Western countries. I do not comment on the necessity, only on the fact that it will often unbalance the local food supply and, faster than any possible offsets, further proletarianize the populations. Is this actually a service to colonial peoples? Consider, again, the intense pressure to meet what is called "world opinion for high levels of social services" in colonies. This leads to often rash expenditures from borrowed or gift-capital or weak revenues, and to "budgets" so out of balance that taxation has to be stiffly increased among peoples with incomes already inadequate, often enough, for a decent livelihood. Is it wise to allow such pressures to lead weak colonies into over-committal? Or, to come nearer home, consider the extent to which Australian "development" policy in New Guinea in 1945-6 was in motive, as much punitive towards "vested interests" as directed in any clear or cogent way towards native development, and consequently soon lost impetus and clarity.

These are, clearly, four very different kinds of influences, with different causation and justification. Many such extraneous influences have been forcing Britain to reverse the order in which its colonial policy should be formed if it is to relate *primarily* to conditions *within* the colonies.

The "Key" Process Within Colonies.

What is now going on "inside" colonies? You will not expect me to give an inventory of the hundred and one social processes under way. Or to give an inventory of the thousand and one situations, interests, purposes and objects. I could not hope here to itemize the "forces" and "factors" at work—money, markets, Christianity, education, booms and depressions, roads, transport, technology, the cinema, the imitation of Western thought and aspiration, and much else besides, in many "patterns" incorporating old and new. You must turn to the anthropologists' texts, with their accounts of the dissolution of magic and sorcery, the spread of secular education, the disappearance of a society of self-sufficiency, co-operation and status, the appearance of a society of exchange, competition and industry.

There is no one "process" of cultural and social break-up, transition and development. As yet, we are scarcely able to analyze scientifically what is afoot. In any one colony you may find, say, large blocs of peasant cultivators in rural areas, largely unmoved from traditional patterns, but the conformity with ancient ways is always partial. In urban areas, you may find crowded tenements,

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or shanty-towns, filled with drifters, "wide boys", decent clerks and mechanics trying to make their way as far as ability, opportunity, structural confusion, racial barriers and (to use Frankel's telling phrase) "industrial caste" will let them, but the "modernism" is seldom complete. You are likely to feel it remarkable that, in such circumstances, conditions are so orderly, that so much moral and material "progress" results. The achievement and stability are, you may think, a tribute to the fundamental good sense working somewhere within the slow, piecemeal, often apparently "fumbling" British system.

If I must select, with severity and thus with some risk of distortion, the most powerful social process going on within colonies, I would say it is a variety of what Pareto long ago called the "*circulation of élites*". In the colonial context, this leads in the political field to a jostle for place and authority, a jostle inevitably accentuated by the British type of colonialism and by the contemporary development "drive".

Colonialism in any form automatically means that old social structures, with their framework of status, rank, authority, power, precedence, right and obligation are weakened; some survive, others topple and disappear; some are transformed, to appear in new guises. New individuals and groups, sometimes new *types*, tend to find their way towards the top. "Dynamic" development speeds up the process. If you increase your development rate you probably tend, over the early stages at least, to increase the rate and complexity of *élite* circulation. You free, motivate, and (in a permissive system) encourage more people to make their bid for place, authority and influence. To hope for a high rate of development without accompanying political and social tensions is to misunderstand both processes.

Inevitably, late or soon (and the less percipient the administration, the sooner) there are those aiming at supreme local authority. You may already often find them somewhere behind, not necessarily in the vanguard, of the "independence", "freedom" or "nationalist" movements. The advanced guard of an army may seize positions, but it is the main body which consolidates and holds. It is at present difficult to be sure where the main force is, or who the general will be, with what allegiance.

Political nationalism is a very strong "force" in many, but not yet all, British colonies. We could scarcely say we have discouraged it; indeed, our political *mystique* has given it every encouragement; and, in a sense, it vindicates the over-arching conception. The Victorians were wiser in their day than we are in ours: many of the

most liberal and farsighted leaders, from Earl Grey on, not only expected but welcomed the emergence of colonial independence movements. We shall continue to hear more of these movements as the internal complexities of colonies increase, and as some colonial Powers weaken relatively to others, lose their interest because of domestic problems, or become confused in their political judgment. So much, after all, is the universal lesson of politics.

Where nationalism now exists it can perhaps only be guided, if (and the assumption is doubtful) we know where to guide it, and have the capacity to do so. Certainly, it cannot be reversed, or eliminated. Many may feel it a dubious "policy" to encourage several scores of weak colonial "nations" to take their place in a world theoretically dedicated to "internationalism". Others will think it "realism", since nationalism may now provide the only "idea" which can mobilize the good will and focus the strength of colonial peoples. No one supposes, however, that that will be the end of the story, but there is little that any one can do to protect colonial peoples from the consequences of their own, or their leaders', options freely exercised within a permissive colonialism.

It would be misleading, of course, to suppose that "nationalism" is everywhere the same phenomenon, has identical origins and objects, or will run the same course. It is not yet common to find a people wholly unified in support of a leader, group or party aiming at "freedom"; but, at one stage, neither was India. Where "native" politics are strong, they are usually at first also highly divisive, as you might expect in a setting, as it frequently is, of several races, cultures, languages, religions, and an immense confusion of loyalties, interests and perceptions. Terms like "freedom", "independence", "self-determination" and so forth, are rarely used as yet with connotations we would recognize, but the problems are onward-moving, and we need elastic minds. Little in the situation can be pre-judged. Those who may newly come to power, however, will inherit, along with office and privilege, most of the problems which the external authority has found difficult to solve; and, in some cases, the problems will be exacerbated, if only because there will no longer be that convenient symbol—someone "foreign" to blame.

The Fine Art of Policy-Making.

From all I have said, which is but the half of it, and I am not sure the right half, colonial policy has its plate over-full. This is a good point at which to ask: What is "policy"? It is a statement about intended action towards goals. It states a projected

programme, an *expected* way in which (mainly) official action can make the desirable and possible, if not certain, at least more probable. But there are many sixty-four dollar questions. Desirable for whom? On what tests? Whose theory of the probable and possible? What kinds of action? By Governments, groups, or individuals? How are the circumstances defined? What measure of agreement is there on definitions of fact?

I cannot pursue these and other such questions, but I venture some general observations. A colonial policy is always a compound affair, made by many minds and hands. At the worst, it may be no more than a crude exercise of authority, at the best an idealistic charter dependent on goodwill. The minds and hands, as often as not, will be found somewhat divided against each other, by disagreement of outlook, interest, motive, and social or political philosophy. The result may be a mixture of agreements and reservations expressing fictions about social processes. The policy has to be made, moreover, *for* large aggregates of (usually) illiterate people, between whom there may be no unity of insight or response. It has to be made *by* authorities with relation to problems which even scientists still struggle to deal with on a descriptive level.

One is often left with grave doubts concerning how much controlled thought is, or can be, given in these circumstances to many great colonial questions; why many actions, expectations and goals are sanctioned; and why there is so constant a *pretence* that authorities know exactly what they are doing. The folklore of policy is an unexplored problem.

Alexander Leighton,¹ in a general critique, puts a viewpoint with which many social scientists will agree:

"In policy-making . . . the conclusions are supported by a structure of logic that extends dangerously high on its mixed foundations of facts and basic assumptions. It is vast in proportion to the facts employed. Frequently, the facts are insufficient to form any part of the foundation, and are fastened on the superstructure here and there for purposes of illustration. Much importance is attached to neatness, brilliance, persuasiveness, dramatic quality, and even to the sheer mass of logical elaboration."

Many policies concocted in this way are, as I have observed elsewhere,² semantic masterpieces, or little more.

Now, policy must deal, to some extent, in "as-if" fictions concerning the probably effects of future action. But what explains such colossal errors as the Tanganyika groundnut scheme? Here you had neatness—a few short pages of masterful prose; brilliance

1. cf. *Human Relations in a Changing World*, 1948.

2. In *The South Seas in Transition*, to be published in 1952.

—Africa's and Britain's problems to be solved by *one* stroke; persuasiveness—reasoned argument backed by well-costed outlay; drama—the conquest of the wilderness; the logical elaboration of unsound assumptions; and the proof by faultlessly wrong arithmetic.

I hope I shall not be misunderstood if I say that, in some circumstances, policy can become the "magic" of futurity. I do not seek to caricature the process, content or goals of policy-making, but to invite attention to the *sociological* obscurities. The problems are complicated. The authorities who have to think up "policy" are not free of impediments. As Leighton says, they have to take into account law, protocol, budgets, other kinds of policy, time, resources, the opinions of other officials, the support which can be expected from legislature and public, and much else besides. Nor are the impediments only "external". There may be, as he says, bad or stupid people in policy-positions. They may have private psychological, economic and political theories which they insinuate, consciously or not. They may think on the basis of established facts, stereotypes, or some kind of deductive mythology. There are also, I would not say a minority, of intelligent, careful, modest men, doing what they can to rescue policy from its own obscurities, or from what Leighton calls the "conscienceless manipulators", who are not few.

But there are other problems, inherent in the nature of policy. The policy-maker has to produce some kind of formula, a charter of action implying *capacity* to do this or that. Here is the rub. In doing this or that, administrative agencies often have to work almost "blind." Consider one matter only: the time-scales within which actions must attain their objects. When, say, colonial "economic development" is planned, who knows what sort of period is required to raise the level of agricultural capitalization from x to $x + 10$? What is the optimum rate? At a given rate, how long before a particular market is saturated? And what then? How long is any economic cycle? Or when a "socially progressive" policy is launched, in an immature economy, how long will it take for an educational process to saturate the predictable demand for skilled workmen? Or what sort of period does it take to change a tribe from being an "uncentralized" to being an effectively "centralized" tribe? Or given a collapsing social system, how long is the cycle before children try to evade, or break up, parental or tribal authority? How long is any social or political "cycle"? Now, no one can really answer these questions. Society would be impossible if we waited till we had certainty before taking action. Are

we not, however, justified in being critical of the policy-approach which seems unaware that there are such problems?

The policy-maker often maintains a pretence, not only of omniscience, but of omnicompetence. He may give the impression, without quite saying so, that authority not only grasps, but is in effective control of social processes, even if this is far from being the case. Otherwise, he admits that authority is gambling in social futures. The most persistent error is a vulgar one: the supposition that social processes are "linear" processes, whereas they are more often "differential", that is, they keep on *progressively* changing their character. Even the acts of policy may so change a set of facts that an entirely *new* problem is constituted. The policy-maker usually has no way of knowing in advance what this new constellation may be. He may, however, maintain the fiction of knowing. In this case, criticism again seems justifiable. The almost unbelievable fits and starts of Australian economic policy since 1945, each accompanied by a substantial act of pretence, are a good illustration.

The policy-maker can rarely take a sufficient range of facts into account at any point of time unless he thinks scientifically. He often finds himself frustrated by forgotten facts or unseen events. His problem is like that of the social planner. The weakness of over-"systematic", highly deductive thinking from general assumptions is that something, assumed to be irrelevant, intervenes from "outside" the "system". If, as is so commonly the case, purely doctrinal viewpoints, and disinterest in the kind of social facts, awkward as they may be, that the scientist studies, are added to the inevitably "as-if" nature of policy, colonial affairs run off the rails about as easily as did Australian affairs under the doctrine of "full employment". One cannot ask for theoretical perfection or universality of insight in policy-thinking. We all know well enough how interconnected social problems are, yet we can deal only with sectional problems in a somewhat piecemeal way. I only criticize the ignoring of this problem, and the inflation of "policy" by pretences that it can do the impossible.

Summary.

My argument adds up to a case for a more empirical approach to colonial policy in its next phase. I suggest that the great underlying diversity of the British colonies probably means, in any case, many different lines of local evolution. That experience promises no comprehensive formulae of stabilization or development. That we face some problems which seem to go almost too deep for

"remedy". That much unnecessary confusion results from uncritical "models" of thought. That uncritical social idealism can easily turn into romanticism. That the "key" process working within many colonies is not a great mass movement in depth, but a sectional struggle to become the *élite*. That the struggle must become more intense and cross-corrupted as the internal problems of colonies become more complex, and will be accentuated when an Imperial power loses its interest, its sense of responsibility, becomes preoccupied with other things, or weakens internally or relatively to other powers. I closed with some arguments for greater realism in the process of policy-making, as well as in arranging the content and goals of policy. "Realism", in this sense of an over-worked word, comes by thinking from the bottom up, not from the top down. It begins, I believe, with an effort to analyze by sociological methods the social facts of particular colonies.

A New Zealander Looks at South Africa.

W. P. Morrell.

South Africa has just been celebrating the three hundredth anniversary of the first permanent European settlement under Van Riebeeck by one of the national festivals characteristic of our age. For a few days there was a political truce. But it may be questioned whether the future historian will find the Van Riebeeck Festival nearly so significant as the fierce political controversy which has been raging for the past year and shows no sign of abating. Never since the Boer War of 1899-1902 have South African affairs excited so much heated discussion; yet never have they needed more cool and unbiassed consideration.

The writer of this article was fortunate enough to spend the year 1951 in studying South African history in the quiet University city of Grahamstown, remote from the centre of the storm. Such an environment does not necessarily rid a man of bias, but at least it diverts some of his attention from the foreground of the South African political scene to the historical background without which it cannot be understood.

Natives and Europeans.

The fact is that South Africa has not solved in three hundred years the problem which Australia and New Zealand solved within a generation, though it took the United States a much longer time—namely the establishment of European supremacy over the aboriginal inhabitants of a territory colonized by Europeans and suited to their colonization. No one can spend long in the city of Cape Town or visit the farmhouses in the beautiful Dutch colonial style among the farmlands and vineyards of the Western Cape without feeling that this is a country which has long been settled by civilized men. Yet over vast areas such as the Transkei there are thousands upon thousands of Bantu whose lives, though changed by contact with the Europeans, are not fundamentally different from those of their ancestors before the Europeans came

to South Africa.¹ There has been no serious armed challenge to the European since the Zulu War of 1879, and whether the Zulu king intended such a challenge is doubtful.² But if the European believed in his heart that the issue had been settled for good and all there would be no need to make "white supremacy" a political cry.

Why has the issue not been settled? Has white settlement in South Africa extended too far? Expansionist pressures were much the same in South Africa as in Australia or the United States. The land in South Africa, except in limited areas, is poor and ill-watered, and suited to extensive pastoral occupation rather than to intensive agriculture. The nomad cattle-keeping Hottentots whom the Dutch found in occupation of the Western Cape offered little resistance to the advance of the European pastoralists and indeed often took service with them as shepherds or herdsmen, though for agricultural work the Dutch thought it necessary to introduce slaves from tropical Africa or Indonesia. From these various peoples, with an admixture of European blood, come the Cape Coloured people of the present day. They have never challenged European supremacy. With the exception of the Cape Malays—a Moslem group numbering some 63,000—they have lost contact with their former culture, and Afrikaans is generally their home language. A bill to deprive those possessing the necessary property qualifications of the franchise in ordinary European constituencies and to create separate communal representation for them seems to many South Africans a gratuitous complication of South African problems and quite irrelevant to the general question of white supremacy.

For over a hundred years there was virtually no contact between the European colonists and the Bantu tribes who had over many centuries been wending their way slowly southwards with their cattle from East Africa.³ In the last quarter of the eighteenth century the two advancing peoples clashed, roughly along the line of the Great Fish River in the Eastern Cape. In 1820 the British Government tried to consolidate this frontier by closer settlement with five thousand immigrants direct from Great Britain. Even then the frontier was not finally secured until three more wars had been fought and the region between the Fish River and the Kei—now known as the Ciskei—partially opened to European

1. See the study of the Amaondo, the most conservative of the Transkeian tribes, in Monica Hunter, *Reaction to Conquest* (London, 1936). The author is now Professor Monica Wilson of the University of Capetown.

2. On this point Sir R. Coupland, *Zulu Battle Piece: Isandhlwana* (London, 1948).

3. *Bantu* means 'people' in the Bantu languages. The use of 'African', now common elsewhere in Africa, is hampered by the fact that the Afrikaans equivalent would be 'Afrikaner,' already appropriated by the Afrikaans-speaking white South Africans.

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settlement. Meanwhile the Great Trek of 1836 had diverted the advance of settlement northwards to the open plains beyond the Orange River, which happened to be unusually empty because of the destructive raids of the Zulu chiefs Tshaka and Dingaan.

It was in Natal, a Trekker colony afterwards taken over and settled by the British, that the experiment of administering the Bantu was really begun. A little later, in 1855, Sir George Grey inaugurated an ambitious system of native policy in the Ciskei. The areas from which Bantu have actually been displaced to make room for European settlers, though not unimportant, are not very large except in the Transvaal. The Bantu are not easily displaced. The densely populated areas of the Transkei and Zululand were not annexed till the later decades of the century and then not from land hunger but because British administration had come to be the only workable solution.

Nor have these areas proved particularly indigestible morsels. The rebellion of 1906 in Natal and Zululand, attributable to mal-administration and in part perhaps to the extension of European settlement into Zululand, was only momentarily serious. There has never been a rebellion in the Transkei. These reserves are overcrowded and in consequence badly eroded. They can only make ends meet by sending a large proportion of their male population out to work in the towns or at the mines. This overpopulation of the reserves is one of the most intractable of South African problems. No conceivable extension of the reserves by reabsorption of European-owned lands would solve it, whatever the more idealistic advocates of *apartheid* may say. The only possible remedy for rural overpopulation in South Africa, as has been found in other countries during the present century, is the development of industry.

The Bantu are a prolific race.⁴ Whereas the Australian aboriginal, the Maori and the North American Indian have passed through a phase of population decline, due to European diseases, war and despair after defeat, and thus have let numerical preponderance pass irrevocably to the European colonist, the Bantu have shown no such sign of diminishing vitality. If the steady increase of the Bantu population is one reason why the establishment of European supremacy has been more difficult than in America, Australia or New Zealand, it does not explain why the problem is becoming more critical. Why can this increasing population not be absorbed in industry?

4. A summary of the 1951 census figures has recently been published in the newspapers. Earlier census figures may be found in the *Handbook on Race Relations in South Africa* (Cape Town and London, 1949).

The Partly Assimilated Native.

Perhaps it can; but this question brings us to the heart of the South African problem. It is not the unassimilated, unsophisticated Native of the Reserves that worries the White South African, but the sophisticated, partly assimilated Native of the industrial cities, the man whose tragic fate (not that his fate is always tragedy) is so movingly depicted in Alan Paton's novel, *Cry the Beloved Country*. The problem lies not in the fact that the Bantu cannot assimilate the industrial civilization of the Western world but in his increasing assimilation of that civilization.

There was nothing deserving the name of a native policy until missionary and humanitarian influences made themselves felt in South Africa. The first policy measures deserving of the name were the Fiftieth Ordinance of 1828 granting Hottentots, Bushmen and free coloured persons equality before the law, the Abolition of Slavery Act passed by the British Parliament in 1833 and the boundary arrangements after the frontier war of 1834-5, when the territory conquered from the Xhosas was retroceded by order of the British Government and treaties were concluded with the tribes on the border to deal with the typical frontier problem of cattle-theft. These policy measures were so unacceptable to the Afrikaner that they converted the slow northward movement already taking place to the High veld into the Great Trek and forced the trekking farmers to formulate their own native policy, based on the *inequality* of black and white. Ever since then there have been two native policies in South Africa.

In due course the liberal native policy of 1828-35 acquired a more positive content in the Cape Colony. The Constitution Ordinance of 1853, which gave the Cape its first representative constitution, had a "colour-blind" franchise, and from the first a number of "Cape coloured" voters—though probably no Bantu for many years—possessed and exercised it. Sir George Grey, arriving as governor in 1854, sought to replace chiefs by European magistrates in the administration of law among the tribes; built a hospital and aimed at gradually supplanting the "witch-doctor" by the European medical practitioner; and made grants to mission schools, especially encouraging "industrial training", i.e. apprenticeship to skilled trades. His ultimate aim was amalgamation of the races in a single society. Meanwhile in the Trekker Republics of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State the Trekker policy of inequality was hardening into law, though circumstances prevented them from trying out their policy either upon the Basutos, who were taken under British protection in 1868 or upon the tribes of the

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Northern Transvaal, whom the Republican commandos were not yet strong enough to conquer.

With the rise of the diamond and gold industries in the last thirty years of the nineteenth century, the problem of the urban native began to appear, though few of the natives who flocked to the mines stayed long and the concentration in the hands of a few great mining companies, who built "compounds" for the migrant mine-workers, provided a temporary solution. For a time indeed the native problem fell into the background. There was serious native unrest in the 1870's; but afterwards the retrocession of the Transvaal, which had been annexed by the British in 1877, and the relation of this Afrikaner Republic to the Uitlanders (foreigners) attracted by its mines monopolized attention.

Developments after Boer War.

In 1903, after the Boer War, a strong commission was appointed to consider the South African native problem, but little came of its recommendations. Far-sighted men saw the necessity of a single native policy in South Africa and used this as an argument for union. "In this way," wrote Lord Selborne in the famous memorandum which paved the way for union, "South Africans, who differ fundamentally in their views as to native policy, agree, that two or more native policies, inconsistent with each other, cannot end otherwise than in confusion and miscarriage."

Yet on the important point of the franchise, the only point of native policy directly raised by the discussion of union, the National Convention of 1908-9 could not agree what the policy should be. There was support for the idea of a uniform franchise based on a "certificate of civilization"; but General Botha roundly stated that "it was impossible for him to lay any solution before the people of the Transvaal that contained the principle of granting the Franchise to the Natives."⁶ This standpoint won wide support from the Transvaal, Orange Free State and Natal delegates. All that they were prepared to do was to leave matters as they were in the Cape Colony and safeguard this provision by requiring a two-thirds majority to alter it. This compromise, which Dr. Malan is now proposing to end, reveals plainly enough the divergence between the incipient liberalism of the Cape, where the seed planted by British missionaries and humanitarians had borne fruit, and the Trekker policy of unqualified white supremacy.

5. *The Selborne Memorandum* (ed. Basil Williams) (London, 1925) p. 112.

6. *Die Konvensie-Dagboek van F. S. Malan* (ed. J. F. Preller—a document which throws new light on these discussions.

So long as this compromise worked, the best hope of avoiding "confusion and miscarriage" was a tentative, middle of the road policy, and this was also the natural outcome of the state of parties in the first generation of the Union. The South African Party, which held office under Botha and Smuts from 1910 to 1924, was a middle of the road party, standing between the Unionist heirs of Cecil Rhodes on the one hand and the Nationalist heirs not of Kruger perhaps but of the more moderate Republicans of the Orange Free State on the other. The absorption of the Unionists in 1920 made little visible difference to the S.A.P. The Liberalism of the Cape, though it had individual supporters in Parliament as well as outside, did not figure in the programme of any political party. The only major measure of native policy in the first decade, the Natives Land Act of 1913, allocated to the natives an area admittedly too small.

When Hertzog came to power in 1924 it was as head of a Nationalist-Labour coalition, though on the important point of making the colour bar against native skilled labour statutory Nationalist and Labour saw eye to eye. On the more controversial question of the franchise, however, Hertzog lacked the necessary two-thirds majority, and he was statesman enough to let this and other Native Bills go to a select committee, from which they eventually emerged as, up to a point, agreed measures. The electoral rights of the Cape natives were whittled away, but not destroyed. The 7000 native voters on the Cape electoral roll were placed on a communal roll and given the right to elect three Europeans to the Union House of Assembly and two to the Cape Provincial Council. Natives in the Union as a whole were given the right, through electoral colleges, to return four Europeans to the Senate. Another Act of 1936 set up a Native Trust and empowered it to increase by about two-thirds, chiefly by purchase as funds permitted, the area reserved for the natives by the Act of 1913.

Apartheid.

The return to power in 1948 of a "purified" and "reunited" Nationalist Party spelt the doom of this period of tentative advance on the broadest possible front. The policy, or rather the slogan, which won the election—*apartheid* or separate development of the races—had evolved from the old Trekker policy of inequality. It attempted to give a more positive content to that policy by stressing the opportunities open to the Bantu to develop in his own sphere. Admittedly there are some constructive elements in the policy. The textile factory run by native labour with a few Euro-

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pean foremen at Zwelitsha near King William's Town has been encouraged, though the initiative belonged to a Lancashire corporation and not to the Government. A non-European Medical School has been opened at Durban, though it is merely an expansion of earlier facilities at Durban for non-European students and perhaps embodies a threat to the non-Europeans admitted in limited numbers to the Medical Schools of Cape Town and the Witwatersrand. The creation of a new Department of Coloured Affairs may lead to greater attention to the economic and social welfare of the Cape Coloured people.

Two objections of principle must be raised to the claim that *apartheid* is essentially a constructive policy. In the first place, even if it be more realistic to think of South Africa as a pluralistic than as a unified society, the relations between the different sections of society ought to be friendly and there ought to be bridges, and not merely barriers, between them. But the Nationalist Government has raised existing barriers and broken down some of the bridges. The Group Areas Act has introduced a new rigidity into the customary practice of residential separation. The system of separate railway carriages, separate buses, separate post office counters has been extended. The Building Workers Act prohibits the employment of native labour in most types of construction work in European areas. There is a proposal to enforce *apartheid* on the few mixed trade unions. The Native Representative Council created by the Representation of Natives Act 1936 as an organ of Bantu opinion has been stultified and mutual consultation is at a discount. Above all, by the repeal of the Asiatic Representation Act of 1946 and by the Coloured Franchise Bill which Dr. Malan is seeking to implement by a simple majority in spite of the adverse Supreme Court decision, the Nationalists are driving the Indians and the Cape Coloured people into the same political camp as the Bantu. On the principles of *apartheid*, this is surely illogical.

To come to the second objection, *apartheid* is only logical as a paper scheme. If it were logically carried through and non-European labour were withdrawn from European farms, European households and European factories, the South African economy would be brought to a standstill. Everyone admits that such a policy cannot be carried through. Even if it be whittled down to the transfer of some factories to the Reserves, there are still difficulties, for the Reserves for the most part are far from the main ports, ill-served by the railway system and unsuited to industrial development. But if the large-scale transfer of factories to the Reserves and the replacement of native labour by European labour in the

factories of the European areas are out of the question, then the problems of the mixed industrial civilization which is growing up in South Africa will still have to be faced and solved.

The electors of the Union have shown no sign as yet of rejecting *apartheid* and its advocates. They have lost no by-elections. They were only supported by a minority of the electorate in 1948, but the electoral system, already weighted in their favour by the "country quota" principle of the Union constitution, has since been made more favourable still by the over-representation of South West Africa.

On some issues, notably the declaration of a Republic and the relation of such a Republic to the Commonwealth, Mr. Strydom; the Transvaal leader, Dr. Verwoerd, Minister of Native Affairs, Mr. Swart, Minister of Justice, and Mr. Eric Louw, Minister of Industries and Commerce, are prepared to move farther and faster than Dr. Malan, but his leadership is not challenged and he has shrewdly brought about a fusion with the Afrikaner party of Mr. Havenga, the political heir of Hertzog, no doubt to strengthen himself against the extreme Republicans. Dr. Malan is also very skilful in making capital out of issues such as the Communist danger, the bitter criticism of South Africa in the United Nations Organization, the rapid advance towards self-government in British West Africa, and perhaps the transfer of the Protectorates or High Commission Territories of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland, on which his aims, though in many cases not his methods, command sympathy beyond the ranks of his own party.

The United Party has hardly yet developed the leadership or the policies likely to wean the electorate away from the narrow but intense and emotionally satisfying creed of Nationalism. Smuts overshadowed the party too long. Hofmeyr, who was too liberal for his party but might now have struck exactly the right note of opposition, predeceased his leader. Mr. Strauss, Smut's private secretary at one time and now his successor, is only too devoted to his memory. Despite his evident ability and sincerity, Mr. Strauss seems to lack the necessary popular appeal.

Torch Commando.

In recent months the Torch Commando has been far more troublesome to the Government than the official Opposition. The nucleus of this organisation is formed by ex-servicemen. Its popular leader, Group Captain "Sailor" Malan, a distant relative of the Prime Minister, and many of its members are Afrikaners. One of its main functions has been to rouse English-speaking South Africa

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from the political apathy which has too long beset it.

It can be said with some truth that politics in the Union has been an argument between two sections of Afrikaners, one disposed to collaborate with the English-speaking population, the other not. The English-speaking section has followed a very different line from that of the French-Canadian minority in Canada and thrown its main energies into business. The fact that the rights of English as an official language are only protected by the same safeguard as has been disregarded in the case of the coloured franchise have no doubt helped to make English-speaking South Africans designs upon the English language; but there remains on record the draft constitution for the republic which the Nationalist press published in January, 1942, and which relegated English to a secondary position in the state.⁷

Perhaps the most hopeful feature of the Torch Commando, however, is that it has been called into existence by an issue which involved the rights of the Cape Coloured population rather than those of any section of the Europeans. I have myself heard references to the service of the Cape Coloured people in the war received with applause and effectively contrasted with the war record of some Nationalists, who were so purblind as to believe that they would enjoy greater freedom if Germany won. If such ties as common service were not so often bedevilled by the issue of white supremacy the future of South Africa would be more hopeful.

It must be remembered, however, that an ex-servicemen's organization has not the same wide appeal as it would have in Australia or New Zealand. Many Afrikaners, perhaps a majority, were opposed to the war. Many who are not Nationalists think it a pity that a small parliamentary majority of thirteen committed a divided South Africa to war. They think—though it would be hard to prove the point—that a waiting policy might in the end have produced a much nearer approach to unity. However that may be, the war policy evoked a bitterness which still finds expression today, for instance in some speeches of Mr. Erasmus, Minister of Defence.

The Torch Commando may have revitalized the opposition but it has probably added to the bitterness of the political struggle. Its leaders have no easy part to play. Such mass movements live upon enthusiasm and thrive in a high political temperature. High temperatures do not conduce to the cool consideration of political problems. Though the allegation of the Government that the Torch

7. On this see M. Roberts and A. E. G. Trollip, *The South African Opposition, 1939-1945* (London, 1947).

Commando has affiliations with the methods of Communism is absurd, and a movement in defence of the constitution has particular reasons for keeping within constitutional bounds, no well-wisher of South Africa would wish her to become a battleground of party armies like the Weimar Republic. Such a situation might indeed, at least for a time, play into the hands of the totalitarian elements which are present, though not dominant, in the Nationalist Party.

For the various reasons mentioned it is unsafe to assume that Afrikaner Nationalism has yet reached the zenith of its power. Nationalism is still the strongest political force in the world, and on many points the Afrikaner deserves sympathy and respect. The rise of the Afrikaner people over the past three hundred years has been a triumph of national vitality over many handicaps. They went out into the wilderness and civilized it. They have many of the social virtues. Their hospitality is proverbial. They have produced many professional men of great ability and high culture, and the present generation is venturing into business with increasing success. They have developed a mere dialect into a literary language, and those qualified to judge give high praise to the best products of present-day Afrikaans literature. The Afrikaner leaders in politics are utterly convinced of the rightness of their cause and believe in its success, and it is the optimists who get things done in politics.

Yet if anything is certain in this unstable age, it is that South Africa will not be permanently controlled by a section of its white population in opposition to the traditional loyalties of the English-speaking section, the deeply-felt resentment of the politically powerless but sensitive Cape Coloured people, the smouldering anger of the virile Bantu, whose leaders are becoming increasingly conscious of their kinship with black Africa, and the mounting disapproval of the outer world.

What can the outcome be? One possible outcome was depicted in terms of fantasy by Mr. Arthur Keppel Jones in *When Smuts Goes*—an increasing resort to Fascist methods by the Nationalists, a second Great Trek by the English northward into Rhodesia or outwards across the sea, a native revolt, an intervention by the United Nations, and a subsidence of the whites into the position of a miserable, tolerated minority in an ill-run Bantu Commonwealth. This nightmare is no more fantastic than the pipe-dreams of some of the prophets of *apartheid*.

Surely the path is not yet closed to constructive statesmanship. There is constructive work being done in South Africa even now.

There are a few bodies devoting themselves to the dispassionate study of "race relations". The South African Institute of Race Relations, the longest established and best known, unites men and women of all races in its membership and its publications, particularly the *Handbook on Race Relations in South Africa* which appeared in 1949, have won wide recognition among thinking people. A more recently founded organization among the Afrikaans-speaking section, though probably wedded to the policy of *apartheid*, has at least promoted a wider study of the facts of race relationship in quarters which would never be reached by the Institute of Race Relations. The Churches, with the exception of the Dutch Reformed Churches—which are of course the most powerful in the country—have spoken out on the general issue of *apartheid* with no uncertain voice. South Africa being what it is, members of the Churches will most often worship in different buildings—one in the "location", the other in the European town—but there is inter-communion and an increasing association of Churches and their ministers in Christian worship and work.⁸

Administrative tradition has also something to contribute. Though departments are seldom repositories of enthusiasm and the Native Affairs Department of the Union harbours no illusions about the natives, the men in charge of particular schemes, whether responsible to the department or to individual municipalities, are in general full of sympathy for their protégés and believe in the future of their work. They would never be willing instruments of oppression. Unfortunately cases are brought to light from time to time which show that the same cannot be said without qualification of the police.

One constructive achievement may moreover be set to the credit of Dr. Malan's recent policies. They have made opponents of his policies think out their own position. The idea of a Bill of Rights, thrown out it is said by a Johannesburg journalist and taken up by the United Party, is a fruitful line of thought. Parliamentary sovereignty was evolved in a society which had been gradually moulded into unity by the great Norman and Angevin kings and the literary and political achievements of a succession of generations. It was not found inappropriate by the wise and experienced men who welded the newly emancipated American colonies into a federal union. It was adopted by the makers of the South African Union, who wished to heal the divisions between British Colonies and Trekker Republics. But there was no unity even in the National

8. See Alan Paton's lecture, *Christian Unity: A South African bias* (Rhodes University, Grahamstown, 1951).

Convention on the question of native policy, the most fundamental of all South African issues. There is surely much to be said in a throw off their apathy. There are many Nationalists who have no multi-racial society for placing a few cherished minority rights or racial guarantees outside the reach of small parliamentary majorities. Moreover in the twentieth century any bill of rights must have a social and not merely a formal or legal content. Though its machinery may be subject to reconsideration and perhaps to drastic revision, the establishment of the welfare state has perhaps been the most constructive achievement of democratic government.⁹

Nevertheless the Bill of Rights and the advance towards the welfare state might have some effectiveness as an answer to the nebulous and negative principle of *apartheid*. The principle of a *Grondwet* or fundamental law can be found in the constitutions of the Trekker Republics. Moreover the Welfare State would seem to be the most appropriate political objective in an age of industrial revolution. Something like an industrial revolution is proceeding in South Africa and, as already pointed out, it is the only possible answer to the problem of the overcrowded Reserves. Need South Africa follow the European cycle of mushroom factories, squalid housing, unchecked industrialism and, by reaction, proletarian socialism? Can she not by a timely development of social services gradually weld her many peoples into a single civilization embracing many cultures at different levels of achievement but working towards the same social ends? If, however she is to make this her objective it will need a sharp turn of the helm.

The intense Nationalism of the Afrikaner, nourished by the isolation of the Trekker Republics, may seem out-dated but it will not easily be diverted from its goal. Nor will it be permanently defeated by clever tactics or favouring circumstance—and Dr. Malan is a master tactician in any case. Even if the Nationalists were unseated in 1953 by the rising cost of living or the onset of depression, there must be some constructive programme to win and hold the allegiance of the electorate, to say nothing of the unrepresented masses of Bantu whose goodwill must be recovered if South Africa, white and black, is to be saved from disaster. White civilization will not be saved by making white supremacy the foremost political issue but only by a New Deal in which all races can claim their share.

9. On the social services, see *Handbook on Race Relations in South Africa*, Chaps. XVI and XVII.

The Price of Political Dependency.

J. W. Davidson.

"I am no more against colonies than I am against the solar system. I am against dependencies, when nations are fit to be independent." The words are Goldwin Smith's—in his book *The Empire*, published in 1863—but the sentiments are those which prevailed in responsible British circles in his day and which have come, through hard experience, to prevail again in our own. Even in the most favourable circumstances—when rulers and ruled are of the same culture—frustration and inefficiency are inevitable. As John Robert Godley, the founder of Canterbury, declared: "I would rather be governed by a Nero on the spot than by a board of Angels in London, because we could, if the worst came to the worst, cut off Nero's head, but we could not get at the Board in London at all." Political dependency is, at best, a regrettable necessity.

This—we should remember—is a summary of the lines of thought which has been propounded by most of those in British countries who have studied colonial rule with open minds. (And their conclusions have been confirmed, of course, by writers—drawn from both the rulers and ruled—who have gained their experience in the colonies of other Powers.) The fevered Jingoism which finds its way into many of the history textbooks and the bitter denunciation which dominates many anti-imperialist tracts are alike valueless as a frame of reference for an investigation such as this. There have, indeed, been projects of colonial expansion conceived in a spirit meriting our respect, and the careers of many who have served colonies—whether as administrators, traders or missionaries—have maintained a high level of devotion to a more-than-personal objective. On the other hand, there has been exploitation, sometimes ruthless and wilful, sometimes largely unconscious—the result of inability to see the consequences of policy for those whom it affected. But most of these are not of the essence of colonial enterprise. Our task lies not in the description of virtue

or wickedness, but in the analysis of the colonial relationship itself.

During the last hundred years, Western powers have assumed political control of "backward" territories, more often than not, when no other step could maintain law and order. Traders, missionaries, planters have moved into an area; the structure of authority in indigenous society has been disturbed by their activities and by the new ambitions and demands which their coming has created among the local inhabitants. Disorder has become endemic. Sometimes, of course, these results have been more or less consciously produced by powerful capitalist groups with political backing—as with Cecil Rhodes; but, far more often, they have resulted from the small-scale activities of a great number of men and organizations. The extension of colonial rule has been no more than an inevitable concomitant of the expanding economy of Western nations.

The British annexation of Fiji in 1874 is a typical example. Trade with Fiji had begun—for sandalwood—in the first years of the nineteenth century. From the 1820's onwards there was a small, but slowly growing, group of European residents, interested at first in the export of *bêche de mer* and later also in that of coconut oil. In 1835 the first Western missionaries arrived; they were followed, nine years later, by Roman Catholics. This Western intervention contributed, in its turn, to changes in the internal balance of power in Fiji. Traders brought muskets. Missionaries gave support to, or withheld it from, chiefs according to their attitude towards evangelizing activities. With the aid of these new resources, ambitious rulers could extend their sway further than ever before. By 1858, when a British consulate was established at Levuka by W. T. Pritchard, the chiefs Thakombau and Ma'afu had gained, between them, a virtual hegemony over the whole group of islands. But this situation did not bring peace and security. Thakombau was worried by the pretensions of Ma'afu and by his debts to Europeans. Considerable property owned by traders, sea captains and others had been destroyed by people over whom Thakombau claimed suzerainty but upon whom, in their everyday dealings, he could impose no restraint. The commander of a visiting American naval vessel had compelled him to acknowledge his responsibility for these depredations and to promise reparations to an amount which he could not possibly pay. In these circumstances, he made a formal offer to cede Fiji to the British Crown. After investigation, the offer was declined. Then, from 1860 onwards, there began a fresh influx of settlers. The basis of this new development was cotton growing. It created a demand for land and labour; it ex-

tended the boundaries of settlement from a few points on the coast to most districts of Fiji; and, by 1870, it had increased the European population to about 2000. Both Thakombau and Ma'afu tried to develop a more effective form of administration; and several groups of settlers formed themselves into political leagues. Finally, in 1871, a constitutional monarchy, with Thakombau as king and a cabinet of Europeans, was formed. But effective government was still not possible. The policy of the cabinet was strongly pro-settler, but not sufficiently so to retain the support of the Europeans. Nothing would have satisfied the planter community short of the unrestricted right to exploit the land and labour of the country, with the full and active backing of the government. In these circumstances, Britain accepted a new offer of cession from Thakombau. Fiji became a dependency; but the Fijian people gained protection against the demands of the settlers.

The case of Fiji is typical of many in which the cession of political authority to a major power has been the least of several possible evils. The same lesson is driven home, in the Pacific, by the history of Hawaii, where a parliamentary form of government was established as early as 1849. Behind the facade of the native monarchy, the settlers steadily increased their control. When sugar planters required additional labour, the government obtained it for them—from China, Japan and the South Seas—but, when the king decided to build a hospital in the hope of reducing the high death rate among native Hawaiians, he had to provide the funds himself. For nearly fifty years—till 1898—the Hawaiian kingdom lingered on. From time to time, annexation was proposed in Washington but rejected—not from any high-minded anti-imperialist standpoint, but from lack of interest and the opposition of those who stood to lose from the free importation of Hawaiian sugar. When the step was finally taken, it was too late to save Hawaiian culture and the Hawaiian people.¹

The preservation of law and order, even the safeguarding of a people against virtual extinction, may, therefore, depend upon the establishment of colonial rule. In examining the evils of political dependency, and the possible means of avoiding or reducing them, it is necessary to bear in mind that autonomy may be no desirable

1. The respective fates of Hawaii and Fiji present, in classic purity, a problem for the social philosopher. Fiji became a colony relatively early. Its people and its culture were preserved. When foreign labourers were introduced, they were given an inferior social and legal status. Fiji has now the problems of a plural society, for which no solution short of eventual domination by one racial group over the others can be foreseen. In Hawaii, by contrast, the various groups had begun to come to terms before a Western government stepped in. Now, they live and work together—in shops and on plantations, in schools and churches, and in the legislature. But the native Hawaiians are a small minority group; their culture is not much more than a tourist attraction.

alternative. There may exist, as has been suggested earlier, only a choice between evils.

What, then, are the defects which are, in greater or lesser measure, inseparable from political dependency? In brief, they are those which result from the unresponsiveness of the executive government to internal social forces. In a sovereign state, the government is finally dependent on popular support or, at least, acquiescence. Under a democratic constitution, this dependence is direct: from time to time, the electorate has an opportunity of passing judgment on the government and, if the latter has lost the confidence of a sufficient proportion of the electors, it goes out of office. Even under a dictatorship ("Nero on the spot") there is the possibility of revolution. But, in a dependency, the local administration is ultimately dependent, not on internal support at all, but on the authority of the metropolitan government. This has consequences of two kinds. First, policy in the dependency is likely to be affected by political changes "at home"—and these may run directly contrary to local trends. Second—and far more important—policy does not keep pace with local social and economic changes.

Of the first type of difficulty, many instances could be given; but I shall confine myself to describing only one—a minor one fraught with no catastrophic consequences, but typical in its essentials. In June 1949, as an official member of the Legislative Assembly of West Samoa, I, myself, moved for the appointment of a select committee "to consider, in view of the statements and discussions at the fourth session of the United Nations Trusteeship Council, whether the existing British Preferential Tariff should be maintained or, if not, what principle in this respect should be adopted in determining rates of Customs duties in future". Earlier that year, and not for the first time, members of the Trusteeship Council had expressed the opinion that the maintenance of imperial preference in Western Samoa was contrary to the provisions of the Trusteeship Agreement for the territory. The New Zealand delegate, under instructions from the Rt. Hon. Peter Fraser (who then held the portfolios of External Affairs and Island Territories, in addition to being Prime Minister), replied that the New Zealand Government regarded the matter as being one to be decided by the people of Samoa themselves; steps would be taken to ascertain their views, and appropriate action would then be taken. As a result, the select committee was formed and carried out a quite elaborate investigation. On 7 November it presented its report² to

2. *Report of the Select Committee of the Legislative Assembly of Western Samoa on the Preferential Tariff* (Wellington, 1950).

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the Assembly. The committee had concluded that, for various reasons, tariff preference had almost no influence upon the structure of the territory's external trade. On the other hand, it unnecessarily complicated customs administration. Its abolition would make it possible to devise a tariff, simple to administer, with low duties on staple lines (mainly essential foodstuffs) and higher duties on luxuries. The committee, and others in Samoa, regarded the report as of some importance. Apart from the value of the recommendations themselves, the procedure which had been adopted in the matter seemed to provide evidence of New Zealand's intention to allow local representatives to exercise an increasing responsibility. Further, this had been the first detailed investigation of a matter of major policy to be carried out by a committee of the legislature. A fortnight after the presentation of the report, however, there was a general election in New Zealand. The Labour Government was defeated, and the new ministry adopted a different attitude. The Minister of External Affairs and Island Territories, Mr. Doidge, in particular, had been an ardent advocate of imperial preference for over thirty years. The undertaking of Mr. Fraser was disregarded; the report was not acted upon.

The result has been unfortunate—although only in a minor way, for the issue was not, in itself, one on which very strong views were held. Doubts as to New Zealand's goodwill were revived. A sense of their final impotence was recreated in the minds of Samoan politicians. The Minister's attitude made it more difficult to prevent the old opposition between officials and local leaders, so common in dependencies, from reasserting itself.

Far more vital, however, are the difficulties which result from the lack of dependence of the executive in the colony upon local forces. These do not result, necessarily, from any lack of goodwill on the part of officials, but from their detachment from local interests and local currents of opinion. Quite often the best-intentioned of policies have the most disastrous consequences. As the first Governor of Fiji, Sir Arthur Gordon, said in 1879, "as much real wrong has been inflicted by the conscientious but narrow-minded desire to act in accordance with maxims in themselves generally sound, but not of universal application, as by violence and consequent tyranny". These high-minded errors can be observed, in one dependent territory or another, in every aspect of policy. Probably they have occurred most generally where attempts have been made to use indigenous political institutions as a basis of district or village administration.

First of all, it is not easy for the official from overseas to gain

a full understanding of the way in which indigenous institutions work. His thinking is, in some degree, limited by his own experience and by the concepts in terms of which his thinking is organized. Secondly, he has to rely on what he is told by individual members of the local community about their institutions. Such people may not be able to explain to him clearly the precise divisions of powers and functions; or they may give him an explanation which is correct traditionally but not in accordance with present facts. On the other hand, he may be given one of several conflicting interpretations, or a definitely wrong account, because his informants are anxious to strengthen their own position. Finally, he is almost certain to have to use such institutions for purposes—e.g., the control of schools or water-supplies—which did not exist at all under the traditional regime.

In these circumstances, it is not surprising that the establishment of a local government system of the indirect rule type nearly always makes changes, if it is effective, in the local balance of power. In parts of Africa, for example, authority has been conferred on chiefs, in ignorance of the fact that it was formerly exercised by them in association with councils. More important, however, in the long run, is the effect which such government action has upon the capacity of indigenous institutions to evolve in response to changing needs, interests, and opinions. Like the colonial government itself, the chiefs or councils which have been adopted into the machinery of administration have become dependent, henceforth, upon legal backing from above, not popular support from below. Unless the government is itself sensitively responsive to opinion, there ensues what Sir Donald Cameron has called a process of "cementing in". Institutions which reflected needs at one particular time are preserved and protected against future change. The result, of course, is friction and inefficiency.

Similar in effect are government policies which perpetuate or intensify divisions between different sections of the population. Often there is reason to suspect administrators of being motivated, in part at least, by awareness of the temporary advantages of applying the precept "divide and rule". More often, however, the explanation is less discreditable—the simple acceptance of a popular belief in "race" differences; the desire to satisfy an economic need (e.g., by importing foreign labour); or the genuine wish to serve the interests of different cultural groups. In Fiji, for example, Sir Arthur Gordon—a man of the highest principles and intelligence—unwittingly laid the basis for the colony's later social cleavages. In 1875 a legislative council was constituted, in which members of

the European settler community were given seats; in 1876 a system of Fijian local government based on existing indigenous institutions was established; in 1879 the first group of Indian indentured labourers was brought into the colony. Thus, existing needs were met. Europeans and Fijians were given political rights in the form which was most appropriate to their respective traditions; and their interests were safeguarded. By the introduction of Indians the demand of the planters for labour was satisfied, without the necessity of forcing Fijians to leave their lands and villages. But, by these steps, the future was prejudiced. The European minority was given a privileged position in the central organs of government. The Fijians were protected, so that they did not have to learn how to hold their own in the modern world. The Indians, who were not repatriated against their will when their period of indenture was over, formed the vanguard of a stream of immigrants whose descendants now out-number the Fijians. Socially, the consequences have been far-reaching. Differences of race and culture and of economic interest, backed up as they have been by differences in legal status and political rights, have produced a cleavage so deep that the possibility of common action, in many things, does not exist. Fijians and Indians face one another as foreigners, fearfully or resentfully, although they live in the same land.

Politically, the creation of a plural society in Fiji has caused the withering of belief in democratic methods of government. Europeans, Fijians and Indians now sit as separate groups in the legislature, representing separate communal electorates, defending or seeking to establish their separate communal rights. Each group has the same number of members, regardless of the size of the electorate it represents, so that a vote in the council has little relation to the strength of political forces in the country. The history of the democratic idea in Fiji is well illustrated by three speeches of Sir Maynard Hedstrom, who was for years a political leader of the settler community. In 1900, when the Europeans were the only group seeking active participation in the central government, he said: "Why are half a million men shoulder to shoulder in arms against the Boers? . . . It is for the franchise. We, the supporters of freedom, are pouring out blood and money . . . and yet, gentlemen, we of the colony of Fiji, are after all only Uitlanders". Twenty-four years later, after the first Indian members had entered the legislative council he had become an outspoken supporter of crown colony government. "I could not at the moment," he said, "suggest a system of government better adapted to our needs." Eleven years later again, in 1935, when he had seen more of the

growing political aspirations of the Indians, he pleaded for the abolition of all elective representation. "At no time in the last sixty years," he asserted, "has it been reasonable to talk of applying democratic methods to the government of this colony." The Fijian members joined him in his rejection of democracy. In a written statement they declared: "In the development of democracy there lies the danger we must all dread—the predominance of ignorance and prejudice in the councils of the colony . . ." Even the Indian members were divided in their views. Division between the three committees were so deep, that it seemed to several of them that their best hope lay in reliance upon the impartiality of an autocratic Governor and a nominated legislature. More recently, the movement towards self-government in other colonies has revived discussions in Fiji of the possibility of a greater measure of popular representation; but the result has been negative. The policy of communal differentiation has gone so far as to make it seem impossible to plan a way forward.

Fiji is but one of the many dependencies where the policy of the administering authority and its local representatives has made autonomy impossible, except by sacrificing the interests of a major section of the population. In Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland and Kenya, self-government would involve the subjugation of the Africans (as it has done in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia) till they were able to assert themselves by force. In Malaya, it has been supposed that it would involve the supremacy of the Chinese, at the expense of the Malays. "Colonialism" has thus made itself morally indispensable till the inevitable breakdown comes.

In many dependent territories this problem does not, of course, present itself in such an acute form. The West African territories, for example, have not been attractive to European settlers, and their indigenous population has been sufficient to satisfy the need for labour. In most parts of the West Indies, the decline in the plantation system during the nineteenth century has permitted the negro majority to rise gradually to power. In New Guinea, this particular problem still lies largely in the future.

In a more limited form, however, it is almost universal wherever there is a dependent government. Between rulers and ruled there exists mistrust and misunderstanding. To the people, their administrators are men who come for a year or two and move on, who are ignorant of, and indifferent to, their own feelings and aspirations, who live in large and conspicuous houses, and subject the people to incessant petty indignities. Only in a few areas, like the Highlands of New Guinea, where the white man is a newcomer,

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is he welcomed as one who adds to the comedy of life. To the administrator (and one speaks only in general terms), the native is ignorant, unreliable, probably untrustworthy.

Both sides, of course, exaggerate. Few administrative officers are as indifferent as they seem, although many lack the capacity to bridge the cultural gulf and see things from the local point of view. On the other hand, events are constantly proving the falsity of European views of native incapacity. Adaptation to new technical skills can come more quickly than Europeans will commonly admit. Just over thirty years ago it was argued in Northern Rhodesia that natives "should be lifted a little bit above the primitive", but not taught to drive motor trucks. Within a few years, of course, they had not only entered this field of activity but proved also that—so far as employers would allow them—they could tackle quite complex jobs in mines, garages and factories. Similarly in New Guinea, it is clear that within a short period a considerable proportion of the work now done by Europeans could be done equally well by natives. Again, in public affairs, positions which require judgment and leadership can be taken over by local people far earlier than is generally admitted before the event. Early last year, for example, the gloomiest prophecies were made as to the working of the new Gold Coast constitution; and the leader of the most active political party, Mr. Kwame Nkrumah, who contested the general election from gaol, was regarded as an irresponsible demagogue. It was not long, however, after Mr. Nkrumah had become virtual leader of the Gold Coast government that the Rt. Hon. John Dugdale, Minister of State for the Colonies, was able to declare that "anyone who doubted whether Africans could assume positions of responsibility must have had their minds set at rest when they met him".³

These misunderstandings and misjudgments are of the essence of a colonial society. As Soetan Sjahrir wrote of Indonesia in 1934: "The European colonists . . . are as far distant from us here as is Europe itself; in fact, even farther, because Europe can be reached by ship or plane whereas the social barrier, the race distinction, in a colonial society is far more difficult to overcome." Only perhaps by living in a dependency can the tenuousness of the links uniting Europeans and members of the local population be comprehended. Even then it will only be fully understood by the few, the *very* few, who establish more intimate contacts. In a territory as socially easy as Western Samoa—where most of the leaders, at least, speak English; where the people do not lack self-assurance—even there,

3. *Times*, 4 July, 1951.

it is doubtful whether at the present moment there is a single European official to whom Samoans freely open their minds.

At times, this lack of contact reaches the point where neither side understands the other at all, where every statement is presumed to have some significance other than that which it bears upon its face. As John Gorst wrote, in reference to the possibility of sending a negotiator to the Wakato Maoris during the wars of the 1860s: "All his promises to guarantee native liberties, all his assurances of non-interference by the colonists, would at first be totally disbelieved". And he added, wisely, that "(without) the confidence of the natives, all our efforts to benefit them only increase their distrust". Under such conditions, government becomes impossible, except by force.

Towards such a breakdown of authority political dependency inevitably tends. If there is not a well-developed political tradition—as, for example, in New Guinea or the Solomons—opposition may find an outlet through primarily religious or economic movements. Such a challenge to authority is likely to be easier to meet than that of a widespread political movement, though the emergence of similar movements from time to time is likely. In more politically developed territories authority is likely to be faced by the demand for immediate self-government. In such circumstances, a more or less complete breakdown can generally be avoided only by the making of radical concessions. During the last few years Great Britain has shown some adroitness in recognizing the inevitable—whether in her relations with India and Burma, or in those with her colonies proper, such as Jamaica and the Gold Coast. Where there is some degree of cultural and political homogeneity in the territory concerned, the change can be made with least danger and dislocation. On the other hand, where opposition to the colonial form of government is linked with deep divisions between sections of the population, rapid political change is likely to precipitate profound social disturbance, if not civil war.

This then is the political price⁴ which has to be paid for a dependent government: social division; lack of trust between rulers and ruled; personal frustration among potential leaders, often turning them into irresponsible demagogues; reform by way of crisis (if not of force or chaos).

4. I have, for reasons of space, not discussed the economic consequences of colonial status.

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It is not a happy picture; yet, as has been shown earlier, political dependency is often the least of possible evils. In some territories, such as New Guinea, a dependent status will long remain necessary because of social, economic, and political backwardness. In others, such as Fiji, the controlling hand of the metropolitan power will still be required because of clashes of interest and outlook within the colony. Even where autonomy is likely to be possible within the foreseeable future, it is undesirable that it should be hastened by the threatened collapse of the existing form of government. Political judgment and the power to lead are qualities likely to emerge fairly soon, when the opportunity to use them is provided; but there are other qualities which are needed in the officers of a responsible government. Only time, training and experience enable men to deal easily with the procedures of administration. For these reasons it is as important that autonomy should be approached gradually, as that the goal itself should be attained.

To what extent, then, can the evils of political dependency be minimized? In the words of Sir William Martin, the first Chief Justice of New Zealand, in reference to the government of the Maoris: "I would plant institutions by means of personal influence. The first confidence must be a confidence in persons". The power of an experienced official who understands and respects the local people, and so has their confidence, is immense. As the aged Sir George Grey said rather flamboyantly to Robert Louis Stevenson regarding the latter's residence in Samoa: "When I heard that a man with the romantic imagination of a novelist had settled down in one of those islands, I said to myself, those races will be saved!" But more is needed, in the practical world, than the "imagination of a novelist". In part this can be provided by training—such as that given, for example, by the Australian School of Pacific Administration for officers of the New Guinea service—so long as the purpose of training is adequately understood. The actual knowledge imparted by such training is of less importance than psychological conditioning to enable the potential officers to react normally to situations and problems peculiar to a colonial environment. It is in his personal relationships, above all, that the success or failure of an officer will be determined. But even the best of training has, of course, its limitations: it can do little good where the recipients of it are unsuited to the work. Thus, for all colonial services, one of the most important functions is the preliminary selection of personnel.

Government Officers, however, must work within a framework

of policy which admits of success. This must have its basis, I think, in the recognition by the administering power that its role in relation to the political development of the dependency is a marginal one. By education, discussion and persuasion it can give direction and leadership to existing local forces. It cannot, with any effectiveness, create local forces of its own or, for long, deny an outlet to those that exist. If it is willing to co-operate with the accepted leaders, it will normally find them eager for assistance and advice. If it opposes them, or seeks to impose leaders of its own, it will have set the stage for the eventual collapse of its regime.

Book Reviews.

AN INTRODUCTION TO WORLD POLITICS. By W. Friedmann. London, Macmillan, 1951. xii+313 pp. (maps and tables).

Throughout the democratic world, people are becoming hypnotised by the increasing polarisation of world power. The bi-polar concept, confined at first to Europe has now been extended to Asia with India and China as the two new potential centres of power. The apparent security of V.E. and V.J. day has rapidly vanished with the kaleidoscopic changes of the post years. As the war time condition disintegrated and the cold war developed, western predominance appeared to disappear, and the confused zig-zag of day to day diplomacy more and more concealed the basic trends of world politics.

Professor Friedmann's volume is in a sense an analysis of anatomical structure rather than a study of international diplomacy of the post war period. What are the moving forces in world politics? The nineteenth and early twentieth century answer would have been largely in terms of aggressive nationalism and imperialism. The Morgenthau and the Schwarzenbergers of the last thirty years conceived of power politics as the vital factor. Professor Friedmann's answer is a more complex one, discarding monolithic explanations. "The great majority of vital world events, then, are determined by a blend of ideological and power motivations which sometimes reinforce and sometimes weaken each other." (p. 21). He is fully aware of the exceptionally complex forms that power takes, and of the close relationship between ideologies and internal social phenomena: one of the strengths of his book is the skilful way in which he brings out the intricate relationship of domestic and external policies in modern states.

What importance can be attached to nationalism and imperialism as motivating forces in international affairs? While one may not wholly agree with his definition or description of nationalism, few would quarrel with his conclusion that "the era of genuine national sovereignty is over" in the modern inter-dependent world; nationalism must be relegated to the cultural plane. One of the real dangers of nationalism lies in its propensities for totalitarianism. The development of German and Italian, Japanese and Russian nationalism has confounded the optimism of the earlier liberal nationalists of the last half century. His treatment of

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imperialism is more perfunctory, although much of the stuff of imperialism runs through his discussion of other problems. The brief discussion of Hobsonian and Leninist theories could have been accompanied by an analysis of Langer's concept of imperialism as "the rule or control, political or economic direct or indirect, of one state, national or people, over other similar groups, or perhaps . . . the disposition, urge or striving to establish such rule or control" and of Sweezy's revision of the Marxist position. The last twenty years have seen a growing tendency to fuse ideologies with imperialism of the older type.

With the increasing polarisation of power in the past five years, attempts have been made to develop a 'third force' in an attempt to establish a new balance and to avert naked conflict. In an interesting and penetrating analysis of western Europe, Asia and the British Commonwealth of Nations, Professor Friedmann has shown that this is either impractical or premature, given the intractable and yet atomistic material. The real value of the British Commonwealth of Nations is today ideological: it has "gained a new strength, which is in inverse proportion to the decline of its physical and military power, and rests on the evolution of the principles and ideological foundations which hold its members together . . . tolerance, respect for freedom and progressive democracy." (p. 171). The Asian Revolution, compounded of aggressive and sensitive nationalism, a social revolutionary movement related to problems of population pressure, and the communist bid for the Asian mind, has not yet produced sufficient cohesion to enable an Asian bloc to alleviate the bi-polar tension. One of the crucial problems emerging is that of the re-orientation of relations between white and colored peoples. The hypnotic influence of the bi-polar conflict is concealing this as one of the basic realities of contemporary world politics.

What are the fruits of the cold war in a bi-polar world? On the credit side must be placed the increasing integration of western Europe: the rapid economic recovery as result of Marshall Aid, the Council of Europe, the Schuman Plan and the development of close military cooperation. The most serious item on the debit side is the sacrifice of liberal and democratic political values, the regimentation of intellectual and spiritual life as the ideological conflict becomes more a power conflict. Professor Friedmann rightly draws attention to disturbing trends in the United States. But despite the witch hunting and evidences of the sapping of democratic institutions, the climate of opinion here is steadily changing in more liberal direction. Thoreau pointed out that "there is no ill which may not be dissipated, like the dark, if you let in a stronger light upon it . . . If the light we use is a paltry and narrow taper, most objects will cast a shadow wider than themselves." Americans today are beginning to use a broader and stronger taper.

This is a stimulating and penetrating book of considerable importance for the understanding of the anatomy of world politics (the title is deliberate). It points out clearly that the struggle for power is not the only reality in the international scene today. Running through it is a deep conviction of the vital importance of beliefs and ideas, the need for "faith and a firm belief in values" of a democratic kind. The concluding chapter points out the role of the ordinary man as an important element in the shaping of policy and the strengthening of values. One would perhaps like to see a fuller assessment of the United Nations, a reference to the Colombo Plan as part of the attempt to solve Asian problems. The alternatives are sometimes posed too bluntly and dogmatically. But these are minor flaws in an excellent work. The maps and tables lend point to the arguments and enhance the value of the book.

—N. D. Harper.

THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, ITS ROLE IN THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY. By Oliver J. Lissitzyn. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1951. Pp. xvi + 118. 8½ x 5½.

So limited appears the scope of the World Court that the layman can scarcely be blamed for occasionally questioning the value of a body apparently as impotent as it is august. Not every conflict of interest is capable of being settled by judicial proceedings in any event, but even such international disputes as are "justiciable" rarely come before the Court when important national interests are at stake. Restricted by the principle of state sovereignty, the Court has to rely upon the consent of the parties, for no state may be compelled against its will to submit disputes to the Court's jurisdiction. Besides, the rules of international law are at best vague and uncertain, nor can the Court be said to have made any great contribution as yet to the progressive development of the law. For, as Professor Lissitzyn points out (p. 70), we have here a vicious circle: disputes are not submitted to the Court because the law is uncertain, while the law remains uncertain because the Court has little opportunity to refine and develop it.

The absence of any enforcement machinery is a further source of weakness. No means exist to enforce compliance with a judgment of the Court, which "has no marshalls or sheriffs at its disposal", so that on a notable occasion—the Corfu Channel case—even Albania could with impunity defy the United Kingdom, and the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, alike.

Such limitations must obviously impair the usefulness of the Court as an instrument for the settlement of international disputes, and it has not, in fact, been called upon to intervene in any of the most serious clashes of the last thirty years, from the Vilna dispute in 1922 to Korea in 1950. If Professor Lissitzyn does not fail to reveal the weaknesses of the system, however, neither does he fail to reveal, particularly in his admirably brief and cogent "appraisal", its virtues and potentialities.

At least a start has been made, he says, and for the first time in history, adjudication of disputes between states by a standing international tribunal with world-wide functions has become a reality (p. 101). If "further progress must of necessity be slow", so must we expect that the setting up of an effective organised authority superior to the independent state will be slow. But perhaps few readers of this scholarly book will be inclined to go as far as Professor Lauterpacht, who contributes a foreword, when he quotes with approval a statement that the Court has probably proved the most successful institution of the United Nations.

Professor Lissitzyn uses the expression "the Court" to cover not only the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, but also the Permanent Court of International Justice in the League of Nations system, since in his view the two tribunals may be regarded for most purposes as one continuing institution. His book—which unfortunately lacks an index—thus deals with the thirty years since the Treaty of Versailles and not, as the title might suggest, only the period since 1945, when at San Francisco the International Court of Justice came into existence.

—T. N. M. Buesst.

June, 1952

THE CHINESE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. By Victor Purcell. Issued under the joint auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs and the Institute of Pacific Relations. London, Oxford University Press, 1951. xxxvii + 801 pp. 2 end maps.

If the position and policy of Communist China represent a major factor for the future of East Asia, equally important is the place of the Chinese in Southeast Asia; for these Chinese will hardly forget the land of their origin or ancestry, and no government of China is likely to ignore the interests of overseas Chinese, especially when this may assist foreign policy.

After a glance at the distribution, settlement and social character of the Chinese in Southeast Asia, Dr. Purcell treats separately the Chinese in Burma, Siam, Indo-China, Malaya, British Borneo, Indonesia and the Philippines, and closes with some general conclusions. The treatment is historical (including pre-European settlement and early European rule) as well as descriptive and analytical; there are appendices on special points and a long selective bibliography; and a Postscript brings the account up to late 1950.

As we cannot do justice to every section of this comprehensive work, we shall concentrate on Malaya in its present emergency. After his historical survey Dr. Purcell treats Chinese social life and education in Malaya and the economic position of the Malayan Chinese. Politics may have seemed unimportant to the Chinese before World War II, but there has been some activity worth study, especially in reference to the Kuomintang and the rise of the Malayan Communist Party: hence a valuable chapter on "Chinese political societies in Malaya, 1911-51". A description of Malaya under Japanese occupation and during liberation is followed by a well-documented analysis of the post-war "constitutional experiment" and the troubles that have culminated in the emergency.

"The constitutional experiment of the Malayan Union," writes Dr. Purcell, "followed by that of the Federation of Malaya had left the Chinese generally in a state of political apathy (since the new constitution greatly favoured the Malays at their expense). When the terrorists, who were largely the old guerrillas of the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army, struck, it was the Chinese themselves who provided most of the casualties on both sides. Many *Towkays* (Chinese business men) were intimidated into contributing to the Communists' funds or supplying them with goods and, being largely isolated, were not in a position to resist these demands. This in turn brought them into conflict with the British authorities. The Chinese squatter community, too, being on the fringe of the jungle was readily utilized by the terrorists and suffered accordingly when British troops and police took reprisals against their villages, burning down their houses and destroying their crops. Many squatters were banished to China. The great danger the British ran was that harsh measures might antagonize large sections of the population, for the government of a great majority by a small minority must ultimately depend upon the consent of the governed."

In view of the importance of the "squatter problem", Dr. Purcell devotes an appendix to it, quoting extensively from the *Report of the Squatter Committee* (January 1949) and from the *Study of a Newly Formed Chinese Agricultural Community* by Professor Raymond Firth, and brings his account up to August 1950 in his Postscript. He sums up: "Even when the terrorists have been suppressed, the basic problems of Malaya will still be very much to the fore. The problem is not merely one of a form of government: it is of reconciling the interests of large, and fairly equally balanced, racial elements." We may wonder,

too, in the increasing tension, how far conditions in Malaya will necessitate a co-ordination of policy, with wider Chinese support, that may turn constitutional developments from the Malayan Federation position again towards the Malayan Union programme.

The other Chinese in Southeast Asia have their troubles. In Indo-China the Chinese community has suffered in the disorders of the civil war: the French have aimed at concentrating them in a few centres, even to the point of overcrowding; at the same time the Viet Minh claim supporters among the younger Chinese. In Indonesia in 1950 the Chinese seemed to be living peaceably, giving the impression that the circumstances which brought them into collision with the Indonesians during the Dutch-Indonesian hostilities had ceased to exist; at the same time Indonesian officials regarded the Chinese as a major problem.

The difficulties of the Chinese under Asian government are shown in Siam and the Philippines. "In both Siam and the Philippines measures to diminish the Chinese share of the retail trade which had been initiated before the war were now intensified and an anti-Chinese plank was inevitable in the platform of every political party." In Siam "the longstanding struggle between the Thais and the Chinese was" (in 1950) "at a stage of uneasy equilibrium." Note that the account of events in Siam throws light on the regime of Marshal Pibul Songkram.

In the Philippines "to obtain election and to retain support . . . the Filipino politicians were bound to pay attention to the prejudices and resentments of their electorate. And foremost among these prejudices and resentments was that against the Chinese." The problems of Southeast Asia, in short, have only taken on new shape with the decline of Western control, and these problems—in economic, social and political terms—are bound up with the position of the Chinese in this area.

Dr. Purcell concludes by treating some special questions about overseas Chinese, e.g. the claim that the Chinese are "easy to govern", their dislike of "being involved" (which has appeared particularly in Malaya), the charges that they are greedy, materialistic, parasitic, usurious, forming combinations obstructive to government, and creating enclaves of Chinese nationalism within the countries they inhabit. He shows that it is hardly fair to refer these charges to the Chinese alone. They are mostly made by men ignorant of the Chinese and often identifying themselves with other peoples afraid of the Chinese. The deplorable weakness of the Chinese is the absence of effective leadership, so that they "sit on the fence" awaiting events in China and the repercussions overseas. The triumph of Communist China has precipitated a crisis: "With this insidious pressure, and with little support or sympathy from the European Powers or the native peoples, the Chinese of Southeast Asia were indeed in a dilemma."

Asian nationalism itself creates as many problems as it meets, and in Southeast Asia, now as in the past, China and the Chinese immigrants are an essential element. This book provides the material for an understanding of the problem.

—A. H. McDonald.

